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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONTROL OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN FRANCE
Charles Torem* and William Laurence Craig**
I.

INTRODUCTION

N February of 1968, the authors described at some length the laws
and regulations governing the control of foreign investment in
France and the policies of the French government in exercising that
control.1 Since that report, however, a number of dramatic changes
have occurred in France. In May 1968, social unrest, starting in th~
universities and spreading to the labor unions, led to a general strike
and a paralysis that threatened to topple the government itself.
Despite a dramatic restoration of order by the government, President
de Gaulle's bid to obtain a new mandate from the French people in
the form of a referendum on the issues of "regionalization" and the
reformation of the Senate failed, and thereafter he resigned from
office in April 1969. A special presidential election was held and
Georges Pompidou, President de Gaulle's Prime Minister from
April 14, 1962, to July 10, 1968, became President and formed a new
government with Jacques Chaban-Delmas as Prime Minister. The
cumulative burden of social upheaval, which had resulted in the
effective shutting down of the greater part of France's industrial
plant for a period of nearly three months, followed by months of
political uncertainty, placed substantial pressure on the French
balance-of-payments position. Despite the reinstitution of exchange
controls in November 1968, large amounts of capital fled the country
for "safer havens." Finally, in August 1969, the franc was devalued
twelve per cent.
All these events have had an effect on attitudes toward foreign
investment and have led to a policy that is, on the whole, receptive
to it. At the same time, the new government has begun to establish
guidelines for distinguishing those relatively few investments that it
will oppose.2 This Article will first review the legal provisions for
the control of foreign investment in France and then will analyze
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2. See pt. IV. C. infra.

[285]

Michigan Law Review

286

[Vol. 70:285

them in light of France's position in the Common Market3 and its
other international obligations. Finally, it will attempt to describe
the developing guidelines established by the government for foreign
investment and will illustrate the application of these guidelines by
a survey of recent investment cases.
II.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF REGULATION

A. Basic Investment Regulations
The principal elements of the current French legal regime on
foreign investment date back to December 1966 and January 1967.
A detailed description of this regime, which has been earlier treated
at length, 4 will not be repeated here. A brief summary, however, may
be useful before proceeding to an examination of more recent developments.
Law Number 66-1008,5 signed by President de Gaulle on December 28, 1966, abolished a complex structure of exchange control
regulations dating from 1939 and dramatically declared that "[f]inancial relations between France and other countries are free." 0 However, this law did give the government power to regulate foreign
investments in France, French investments abroad, and exchange
operations by decree if necessary to defend national interest. 7 This
power was almost immediately invoked to erect an entirely new
system for the control of foreign investments in France and French
investments abroad. Decree Number 67-78 of January 27, 1967,8 in
setting up this new system, defined the category of "direct investments" to include
[t]he purchase, the creation or the extension of any business, branch
or individual enterprise; [and] [a]ll other operations which alone or
together with others, concurrently or consecutively, have the effect
of permitting a person or persons to acquire or increase the control
of a company . . . , whatever may be its form, or to assure the expansion of such company already controlled by them. 0

Thus the creation of a French corporation, or obtaining or increas3. The terms "Common Market," "European Economic Community," "EEC," and
"Market" are used interchangeably in this Article.
4. See Torem 8: Craig, supra note I, at 676-96.
5. [1966] J.O. 11621, [1967] D.S.L. 30.
6. Id. art. I.
7. Id. art. 3.
8, [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] D.S.L. 81.
9. Id. art. 2(3)(a) 8: (b) (emphasis added). For further discussion of this definition,
see Torem 8: Craig, supra note I, at 682-87.
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ing control of an existing one, by foreigners constituted a "direct
investment." Similarly, certain activities of any French corporation
already under foreign control, such as the acquisition of a new plant,
the establishment of a branch, or the creation or acquisition of
another French corporation, also fell within the category of "direct
investments."10 While this hastily drawn decree11 was silent with
respect to what constituted "control," administrative practice has
applied a very strict test. Indeed, in some cases, the purchase of only
small percentages of the capital of a corporation has been said by
the Ministry of Finance to constitute a purchase of control and
hence to be a direct investment.12 Likewise, financial dealings other
than the purchase of an equity interest may effectively submit a
French company to foreign economic control;13 thus, these relationships may be classed as "direct investments."
Direct investments were made subject to the filing of a prior declaration with the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry could, within
two months after the filing, require a temporary postponement of
the investment to allow further study or to permit changes by the
applicant in the conditions of the investment in order to meet government objections. 14 In some cases this temporary postponement
was permitted by the Ministry to ripen into an ajournement definitif, or, in effect, a denial of investment authorization.15 I£ the
Ministry did not act within two months, or if prior to the expiration
of that period it renounced its right to require a postponement, the
applicant was free to proceed with the project.16
In contrast to foreign direct investments (which were subject to
the prior-declaration procedure and the "postponement" mechanism), foreign loans and financings of all other kinds needed prior
specific authorization from the Ministry of Finance before a transaction could be executed.17 This procedure was to be followed for all
borrowings from abroad that did not constitute direct investments
under the definition of Decree Number 67-78. Three categories of
10. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 2(3)(a) &: (b), (1967] J.O. 1073, (1967]
D.S.L. 81.
11. The haste was necessitated by a provision of Law No. 66-1008 of Dec. 28, 1966,
[1966] J.O. 11621, (1967] D.S.L. 30, that gave the government only thirty days in which
to issue decrees reinstituting controls. See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 678-79.
12. See Torem &: Craig, supra note I, at 685.
13. See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 685 &: nn.68-69.
14. See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 679, 682 &: n.58.
15. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4(1), (1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] D.S.L. 81.
See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 682.
16. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4(1), (1967] J.O. 1073, (1967] D.S.L. 81.
17. See Torem &: Craig, supra note I, at 687-89.
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financing, narrowly defined by the decreei were not subject to the
special authorization requirement and were thus free. These special
categories included loans from abroad to finance services rendered
abroad or commercial transactions between France and foreign
countries,18 loans from abroad to certain banks and finance companies,19 and loans from abroad to a borrower in France, as long as
that borrower's cumulative total of such loans outstanding remained
less than 2 million francs. 20
A parallel regulation, Decree Number 67-82, required the prior
submission to the Ministry of Industry of all contracts calling for the
acquisition of, or the obtaining of a license for the use of, industrialproperty rights by French residents from foreign sources.21 The
Ministry, in turn, was empowered to study the technical and financial terms of the agreement as well as the probable effect on the
development of French technology and to render a favorable or
unfavorable opinion within forty days. While the legal effect of an
unfavorable opinion was never clear-as the decree was not published pursuant to general exchange control regulations, nor were
any special sanctions provided-parties acting without the Ministry's
approval might anticipate difficulties with tax and customs authorities,22 who were automatically notified whenever an unfavorable
opinion was rendered. The purpose of the decree was not only to
ensure that royalty payments abroad were not being made as a device
to reduce French taxes but also to put the entire area of the licensing
of industrial-property rights by nonresidents under local surveillance
and control. It was hoped that French companies could be discouraged from taking foreign licenses-with their adverse effect upon the
balance of payments and the development of local technologywhen there were alternative French sources of supply.
B.

Reimposition of Exchange Controls

In the past three years there have been several modifications in
this regulatory scheme. By far the most important of these changes
has been the reimposition of exchange controls. Following the financial crisis of 1968 in France, there was fear that devaluation of the
18. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 6(2), [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] D.S.L. 81.
19. Id. art. 6(3).
20. Id. art. 6(4).
21. Decree No. 67-82 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1081, [1967] D.S.L. 83, later
implemented by Arrete (departmental regulation) of the Ministry of Industry, March
6, 1967, [1967] J.q. 3173, [1967] D.S.L. 173.
22. For further discussion of these difficulties, see Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at
691-92.
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franc might become necessary. Under this pressure, the government
issued Decree Number 68-1021 on November 24, 1968,23 which reimposed exchange controls in substantially the same form as before
1967.
Once again, all exchange transactions, movements of capital, and
payments of all types between residents- and nonresidents of France
were required.to be- channeled through intermediaires agrees, 24 or
authorized intermediary banks. These banks, which are listed in a
Ministry circular,25 play an essential role in the effectuation of exchange controls since they act as agents of the government pursuant
to a delegation of power. They control all transactions that are
permitted under a "general authorization." General authorization
was given in the decree of November 24, 1968, for certain kinds of
current payments for imported goods, services rendered, royalties
and license fees, rents, interest, dividends, research and engineering
exchanges, medical expenses, wages, insurance, taxes, inheritances,
repayments of loans, and the like.26 All other payments by a resident
to a nonresident were prohibited unless specific authorization was
obtained from the Ministry of Finance.27 All imports in excess of 250
francs and all exports in excess of 1,000 francs were required to be
registered with an intermediaire.28 Claims of French residents held
abroad or against nonresidents and derived from the export of goods
and services, as well as income earned by residents abroad or from
nonresidents, had to be repatriated. 29 The amount of money that
could be carried by French residents on trips outside France was also
strictly limited and policed.30
The reimposition of exchange controls was designed as a purely
monetary measure to support the currency. It was announced as both
extraordinary and temporary,31 but, as previous exchange controls
23. [1968] J.O. 11081, [1968] D.S.L. 325.
24. Id. arts. 1-2.
25. Arr~t~ of the Ministry of Finance, Aug. 26, 1969, [1969] J.O. 8642.
26. Decree No. 68-1021 of Nov. 24, 1968, art. 2, [1968) J.O. 11082, [1968) D.SL. 325.
27. Id. art. 6.
28. Ministry of Finance Circulars of Nov. 24, 1968, [1968) J.O. 11087, [1968) D.S.L.
327: Nov. 25, 1968, [1968) J.O. 11105, [1968] D.S.L. 327: Nov. 27, 1968, [1968] J.O. 11171,
[1968] D.S.L. 330.
29. Decree No. 68-1021 of Nov. 24, 1968, art. 6, [1968] J.O. 11082, [1968] D.S.L. 325.
30. Arr~t~ of the Ministry of Finance, Nov. 24, 1968, [1968] J.O. 11085, [1968]
D.S.L. ll27; Dec. 31, 1968, [1969] J.O. 39, [1969) D.S.L. 36; April 11, 1969, [1969) J.O.
3592, [1969] D.S.L•. 159; Dec. 23, 1969, [1969) J.0. 12578, [1970) D.S.L. 15; April 28,
1970, [1970] J.O. 4029, [1970) D.SL. 121; Aug. 4, 1970, [1970] J.O. 7410, [1970) D.S.L. 223.
lll. See International Herald Tribune, June 6, 1968, at 9.
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lasted for nearly thirty years in France (from 1939 to 1967),32 it may
be doubted whether the new controls will be rapidly dismantled.
C.

Changes in the Investment and Loan Control Mechanism

Many of the recent changes in the procedures for clearance of
direct investments and loans to borrowers in France are either adaptations related to the reimposition of exchange controls or clarifications required by practical experience with the regime erected in
1967. These changes left the basic dichotomy between direct investments and borrowings33 intact and constituted, for the most part,
refinements of these categories. The impact of the changes has been
to subject all foreign direct investments and loans to added exchange
control procedures. Loan and guarantee controls were also modified
so as to maximize the favorable contribution of foreign loans to the
French balance of payments and to minimize the possibility that
outstanding foreign loans could be liquidated at times of currency
crisis and thus weaken the position of the franc. The direct investment regulations were altered in minor fashion to be consistent with
the exchange controls and, in theory, to free from control direct
investments originating from other Common Market countries.
While this modification was substantial in form, it will be shown
that, because of parallel changes in exchange controls, there has been
no significant liberation from French government control of direct
investments in France-even investments originating from within
the Common Market.
I. Loans and Guarantees

In October 1969, a Ministry of Finance circular was devoted to
clarifying the law on guarantees given in favor of French companies
by nonresidents,34 which have the effect of permitting the French
company privileged access to franc-financing on the local French
market. The circular deals with guarantees given by related foreign
32. Investment controls began with Decree of Sept. 9, 1939, [1939] J .0. 11266, [1939]
D.P. IV. 412, and ended (temporarily) with Law No. 66-1008 of Dec, 28, 1966, [1966]
J.O. 11621, [1967] D.S.L. 30.
33. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
34. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of Oct. 15, 1969, [1969] J.O. 10662, [1969]
D.S.L. 388, clarifying Decree No. 69-264 of March 21, 1969, art. 1, [1969] J.O. 3066,
[1969] D.S.L. 139, amending Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 3, [1967] J.O. 1073,
[1967] D.S.L. 81, and Arrete of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969, [1969] J.O.
3067, [1969] D.S.L. 140, amending art. 1 and abrogating art. 2 of Arrete of Jan. 27, 1967,
[1967] J.O. 1074, [1967] D.S.L. 82. See Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21,
1969 (relative to investments), tit. I, pt. II, [1969] J.O. 3067, [1969] D.S.L. 140,
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corporations (sister and parent) as well as with guarantees by unrelated entities.
The question of the treatment of guarantees by related corporations had earlier been in doubt. These guarantees were not foreign
loans and therefore were not subject to the prior-authorization procedure. It could be argued that in many cases such guarantees do not
per se constitute an increase of control, and hence should not be
subject to direct-investment procedures. The new circular makes
clear that all guarantees by related foreign companies (including
guarantees by foreign banks based on guarantees by related companies and guarantees by other French related companies) shall be
treated as direct investments and shall be subject to the prior-declaration procedure.36 This means that such guarantees are subject to
ajournement, or government veto, and that if no action is taken by
the Ministry within sixty days the declarant may proceed to make
the guarantee in question.
An exception to the direct-investment treatment for related guarantees is provided, however, for guarantees that meet the following
three criteria: (1) the loan guaranteed must be motivated by the
normal operations of the borrowing concern and must not be used
by it for purposes amounting to an investment; (2) the aggregate of
all outstanding advances and credits, including the one in question,
must not exceed the aggregate of the borrower's stated capital, reserves, undistributed profits, and long-term advances from abroad,
repayable after the advances in question; and (3) the aggregate
amount of the planned loan, plus all previously guaranteed loans to
the same firm, must not exceed 2 million francs. 36 Guarantees
meeting these criteria are "free" (i.e., no prior declaration is required), but proof that these conditions are met must be given to an
intermediaire before the guarantee is executed and an accounting
must be made to the Treasury within twenty days after its execution.37
Guarantees given by nonresidents other than corporations of the
same group are subject to the requirements for direct investments if
such guarantees give control of the borrowing firm to the guarantor.88 All other guarantees are subject to the rules on loans and
35. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of Oct. 15, 1969, tit. II, art. I(l), [1969]
J.O. 10662-63, [1969] D.S.L. 388.
36. Id. tit. II, art. I(2)(B).

37. Id. tit. II, art. 1(3).
38. Id. tit. II, art. II.
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must receive a special authorization, unless the loan itself could be
made without authorization, as described below.
As to loans themselves, Decree Number 67-78 had exempted
from the prior-authorization procedure those borrowings that
amounted to direct investments and were the subject of a prior
declaration. 39 In addition, Decree Number 67-78 had exempted from
authorization the following transactions: (I) loans from abroad to
finance services rendered abroad or commercial transactions between
France and foreign countries or between foreign countries; (2) loans
to certain banks and finance companies; and (3) loans from abroad,
as long as the borrower did not have a cumulative total of more than
2 million francs of such loans outstanding. 40
Decree Number 69-264 of March 21, 1969, restricted the second
category above by requiring that a borrower also be an intermediaire
agree (i.e., an authorized bank) and struck out all the other conditions of exemption, authorizing the Ministry to provide them by
circular.41 The ministerial circular of the same date essentially recreated the exempt categories with modifications.42 The first category
above was limited to loans to industrial enterprises for the financing
of operations performed abroad, to enterprises of any kind for the
financing of imports into France or exports from France, and to
brokerage houses for the financing of international operations.43 To
the 2 million franc maximum of the third category the circular
added several new conditions: that the interest not be higher than
the normal market rate, that the total amount of the loan be realized
from the sale of foreign exchange or from the debit of a foreign franc
account, and that full documentation be provided to an intermediaire agree and forwarded by it to the Treasury, together with a
compte-rendu (an accounting), within twenty days. 44
The latter two categories were again modified by circular on July
24, 1970. This circular required for both categories that the loans be
expressed in a foreign currency and, when the corresponding franc
value of the loan was put at the disposition of the borrower, that an
interval of at least one year separate each repayment installment,
that prepayment must not be permitted, and that, if renewal is
39. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 6(1), [1967] J.O. 1074, [1967] D.S.L, 81.
40. Id. art. 6(2)•(4).
41. Decree No. 69-264 of March 21, 1969, art. 1, [1.969] J.O. 3066, [1969] D.S.L, 189,
amending Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 6, [1967] J.O. 1074, [1967] D,S.L, 81.
42. See Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969 (relative to loans),
tit. I, [1969] J.O. 3068, [1969] D.SL. 140.
43. Id. tit. I(A).

44. Id. tit. I(B).
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allowed, it must be for at least one year. 45 The apparent purpose of
these provisions is to encourage-or at least to permit-recourse to
the international financial market for relatively long-term loans with
stable terms. At the same time, short-term, "call" financing, which
may have an unstable effect on the French economy and balance of
payments in times of stress, is discouraged. Much financing of subsidiaries by foreign parents takes place pursuant to the provisions
of this exception; and when special authorizations are required for
larger loans to subsidiaries on conditions similar to those that would
qualify a small loan under this exception, the authorization is usually granted. It is realized that such financing frequently takes the
place of new contributions to equity and is equally stable. At the
same time, these guidelines hinder resort to "thin" capitalization and
overreliance on borrowing.
The circular of March 21, 1969, also ·detailed the duties of intermediaires, pursuant to the 1968 exchange regulations, in handling
the repayment of loans.46 They were instructed to require evidence
that the loans in question had been regularly contracted within the
requirements of the law and that all the proper documents had been
filed before transmitting the repayment. The necessity for a regulated exchange transaction at the time of repayment was thus used
to enforce the regulations on loans. This circular further provided
that the repayment of loans exempt from authorization could be
freely postponed subject only to notification of the Treasury, but
that prepayments could not be made without prior approval of the
Treasury unless expressly provided for in the loan contract.47 In the
case of loans that required administrative authorization, no changes
whatever could be made in the payment schedule without the prior
consent of the Treasury.48
,
The March 1969 circular, together with an arrete (departmental
regulation) of the same date, 49 made it clear that comptes-rendus are
required to be furnished to the Treasury within twenty days after
45. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of July 24, 1970, [1970) J.O. 7038, [1970)
D.S.L. 218, amending Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969 (relative
to loans), tit. 1(2), [1969) J.O. 3068, [1969] D.S.L. 140.
46. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969 (relative to loans), tit.
II(l), [1969] J.O. 3069, [1969] D.S.L. 140.
47. Id. tit. II(2). After the circular of the Ministry of Finance of July 24, 1970,
[1970) J.O. 7038, [1970] D.S.L. 218, the loan contract could not contain a prepayment
clause and still be exempt from the prior-authorization requirement.
48. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969, tit. Il(2), [1969] J.O.
3069, [1969] D.S.L. 140.
49. Arrl!te of the Ministry of Finance, March 21, 1969, [1969] J.O. 3067, [1969] D.S.L.
140.
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the execution of all loans exempted from authorization by the terms
of ministerial circulars as well as after execution of all loans that
required authorization.50 A compte-rendu must also be made within
twenty days of the repayment of any loan whatsoever.

2. Direct Investments
The first change affecting investments came in March 1969 with
a decree making the liquidation of French investments abroad subject to prior declaration and the Ministry's right to require postponement.51 Prior to this decree, the liquidation of both French investments abroad and foreign investments in France could be carried
out freely, with only subsequent notice to the Ministry within
twenty days. 52 This rule remains unchanged for foreign investments
in France. However, under the exchange control regulations, the
funds resulting from the liquidation of a foreign investment in
France cannot, in fact, be transferred abroad until supporting documents are presented to the Treasury through the intermediaire and
an affirmative response is received. 63 The apparent purpose of this
procedure is to verify the "reality of the transaction," i.e., to ensure
that it was, in fact, the liquidation of a legitimate prior investment.
In June 1969, a Ministry of Finance circular made a special
dispensation for liquidations involving less than 1 million £rancs.n 4
In such cases, the intermediaire would be licensed to transfer the
liquidation proceeds without awaiting the Treasury's response to
the supporting documents filed with the bank to justify the liquidation.
Although these changes were minor and reflected the necessity
of stricter protection of the French balance-of-payments position, a
much more drastic change in the fabric of direct-investment controls was made in February 1971 when, in settlement of a 1969 law
suit instituted by the EEC Commission against France before the
European Court of Justice, 55 France amended its direct-investment
50. Id.; Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969, tit. I(B)(3), [1969]
J.O. 3069, [1969] D.S.L. 140.
51. Decree No. 69-264 of March 21, 1969, art. 1, [1969] J.O. 3066, [1969] D.S.L, 139.
52. See Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, arts. 3(2) &: 4(2), [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967]
D.S.L. 81.
53. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of March 21, 1969, [1969] J.O. 3067, [1969]
D.S.L. 140.
54. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of June 13, 1969, [1969] J.O. 60!i0, [1969]
D.S.L. 260, as modified, Circular of the Ministry of Finance of Sept. 8, 1970, [1970]
J.O. 8632.
55. See pt. III. B. infra.
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controls to exempt direct investments between France and other
Common Market countries. The amending decree stated that the
prior-declaration procedures for direct investments shall not apply
to
the constitution or the liquidation of direct investments in a me~ber country of the European Economic Community other than
France by French domiciliaries [ressortissants] whether natural persons, companies or establishments, nor to operations relative to the
constitution in France of direct investments by domiciliaries [ressortissants] whether physical persons, companies or establishments
of a member country of the European Economic Community other
than France.56
It should be noted that, on its face, this liberalization is vast
indeed, for not only does it free direct investment in France by
nationals of the other EEC countries, but it also quite clearly frees
direct investment made by a corporation duly established in a member country, even though that corporation is itself under foreignpossibly American-control. 57 Since, as will be described below, 68
it is just this "Trojan Horse" problem that has been at the root
of France's prior refusals to relax its direct investment rules with
respect to intra-Common Market investments, it might be thought
that this modification was significant indeed. Such was not the case,
however, for on the same day that it relaxed its intra-EEC directinvestment controls, France tightened its exchange controls so as to
subject to government authorization practically all the investment
operations simultaneously liberated from the direct-investment controls. Under this new exchange control regulation, all direct investments-including those made from within the Common Market
-are subject to the making of a prior declaration. 59 Then, the
regulation continues, when these operations
are susceptible of causing a movement of capital, their realization
requires a prior authorization from the Minister of Finance, and the
"prior declaration" shall serve as a request for such an authorization.
In other cases, and reserving the provisions of Decree No. 67-78 of
January 27, 1967, the declaration serves statistical purposes.60
56. Decree No. 71-143 of Feb. 22, 1971, [1971] J.O. 1832, [1971] D.S.L. 128.
57. This result is clear from the meaning of the term ressortissant as applied to a
corporation. See text accompanying notes 84-88 infra.
58. See text accompanying notes 85-104 infra.
59. Decree No. 71-144 of Feb. 22, 1971, [1971] J.O. 1832, [1971] D.S.L. 128, modifying
the exchange control regulation, Decree No. 68-1021 of Nov. 24, 1968, (1968] J.O. 11081,
[1968] D.SL. 325.
60. Decree No. 71-144 of Feb. 22, 1971, art. 4, [1971] J.O. 1832, [1971] D.S.L. 128.
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The import of these nvo modifications taken together is that,
with respect to intra-Common Market investment, France has given
.up its specific veto power under the direct-investment regulations
only to require a specific government authorization under the exchange control regulations when a direct investment gives rise to
a capital movement. 01 Since the essence of foreign direct investment
is the transfer of foreign capital, the "liberation" of intra-Community investment is largely illusory. 62 As to direct investments from
outside the Common Market, the regime in practice remains the
same: either the direct investment gives rise to a movement of
capital, in which case it is subject to the requirement of a prior
authorization as set forth above, or it does not, in which case the
government still retains its right to impose a "postponement" (which
can become permanent) pursuant to the provisions on direct investment in Decree Number 67-78.
While the over-all impact of these modifications is not substantial, there are some direct investments not giving rise to capital
transfers that, insofar as intra-Common Market investment is concerned, are newly liberated. In particular, the expansion of French
corporations controlled by domiciliaries of another Common Market
country is no longer subject to authorization unless a capital transfer is required. Under prior law, every purchase or creation of a
new plant or facility constituted a direct investment subject to
government veto. 63 Now it would appear that as long as such French
company expansion-including, apparently, even the acquisition of
other French corporations-is financed within France, without a
capital movement from abroad and without a guarantee given from
abroad to French lenders, the government retains no power to impose a veto. 64 All this is, at most, a very small opening in the wall
of controls.
It further appears that with respect to third-country investment
61. One result of the change of the regulatory basis for controlling foreign investment
might be that the specific sixty-day "statute of limitations" given to the government to
request an "ajournement" of an investment under the foreign investment regulations
(Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. (4)(1), [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] D.S.L. 81) need no
longer be respected, a11d the government may refrain from issuing an authorization for
as·long as it deems fit.
·
62. This is true even without considering the expansive interpretations that could
conceivably !le given by the Ministry of Finance to the term, "susceptible of causing a
movement of capital," in the regulation.
63. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 2(3)(B), [1967) J.O. 1073, [1967) D.S.L.
81. See Torem 8: Craig, mpra note l, at 686.
64. Note, however, that if local expansion is financed either by foreign loans, or
by foreign loans or local loans guaranteed by nonresidents, the transaction is subject
to regulation. See pt. II. C. I. supra.
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the government has· reserved the right to apply the ajournement
powers of direct investment Decree Number 67-78 even in those
cas~s in which the direct investment does not cause a capital flow,
or in which the extension of a controlled· French · corporatiox:i is
financed locally or out of earnings. This is because, in the case of
extra-Community investments, the government can rely on· its directinvestment ajournement procedure as well as on the power to deny
exchange control authorization.
·
D. Indus~rial Property Rights Contracts
Decree Number 67-82 of January 27, 1967,65 which provided for
the prior submission of all contracts with nonresidents involving the
assignment of any industrial property rights, including technical,
scientific, and engineering assistance, for ministerial review and opinion:, was abrogated and replaced on May 26, 1970, by Decree Number 70-441. 66 The new decree makes no provision for an opinion
or other expression of approval or disapproval on the part of the
Ministry of Industry; rather it simply requires the filing of all such
contracts with the Ministry after they have been executed. A number is then assigned to each contract; this number is to be used by
the intermediaire in clearing license fees or royalties for transactions
abroad. The immediate reason for this change was the objection
by the EEC Commission67 that this French control of contracts involving industrial property rights contravened the provisions ·of the
Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty) 68 when applied to intra-Common
Market contracts. After receiving a formal complaint .by the Commission, France decided to liberalize the regulations for all, including American and other third-country licensors. On a broader
plane, the revision represents a retreat from the attempts to regulate and influence private industry in acquiring foreign licenses
and technology. It may be surmised that the prior efforts of the
government to influence industrial policy by this contract mechanism were not sufficiently rewarded by positive results. The present
filing procedure provides a mechanism that will permit the government to verify that royalty or other such payments made abroad are
65. [1967] J.O. 1081, [1967) D.S.L. 83, later implemented by Arrete of the Ministry
of Industry, March 6, 1967, [1967] J.O. 3173, [1967] D.S.L. 173.
66. [1970] J.O. 4991, [1970] D.S.L. 129.
67. 13 E.E.C. J.O. No. C 3/3 (1970) (response of Dec. 8; 1969, to a Parliamentary
question of Nov. 13, 1967).
68. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Done at Rome March
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
·· · •

298

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:285

bona fide and to ensure that neither exchange controls nor taxes
are evaded.
E. Monetary Regulations Afjecting Investment and Financing
The modifications of French exchange and investment controls
during the period 1968 through 1970 as described above reflected in
large part a desire to protect the franc from stronger currencies, particularly the American dollar. By August 1971, however, the dollar
itself was in difficulty because of the ever increasing United States
balance-of-payments deficit. In order to avoid outright dollar devaluation, on August 15 President Nixon imposed a ten per cent sup•
plemental duty on all imports into the United States00 and denied
any further obligation to convert dollars into gold at the demand of
foreign holders. 70 United States government representatives intimated a willingness to negotiate removal of the ten per cent
surcharge on a selective basis with foreign governments that "cooperated" in solving the international monetary crisis.71 It was the
intention of this American policy to force selective revaluation of
stronger currencies, while leaving intact the exchange ratios between
the dollar and weaker currencies.72
The flow of more and more dollars into a few strong currency
countries brought about significant pressures for revaluation. In
most European countries, as well as in Japan, these pressures succeeded in causing the governments to permit their currencies to
"float" in relation to the dollar. 73 The initial upward movement of
these strong currencies in relation to the dollar, if not constituting
a definitive revaluation, did momentarily ease the pressure for out•
right devaluation of the dollar.
France, however, was not ready to permit the general float or
revaluation of the franc that could have impaired its long struggle
69. Presidential Proclamation No. 4074 of Aug. 16, 1971, CCH BALANCE OF PAY?>mNTS
REP., 11 9070 (1971).
70. See Policy Guideline in President's Economic Program, released by White House
Press Secretary, Aug. 15, 1971, CCH BALANCE OF PAYllmNTS REP., 11 9073 (1971): Press
Conference of Treasury Secretary John M. Connally of Aug. 15, 1971, CCH BALANCE
OF PAYl.mNTs REP., 11 9072 (1971) [hereinafter Press Conference].
71. See Press Conference, supra note 70, at 9149.
72. The policy has proven in part to be successful. On December 19, 1971, the International Monetary Fund approved a new set of exchange rates negotiated by the
Group of Ten, which effectuate a devaluation of the dollar and a revaluation of most
of the other leading currencies. In addition the United States agreed to remove the
10% import surcharge. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
73. See International Herald Tribune, Aug. 21·22, 1971, at 1, cols. 7-8 ("float" of
currencies of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands); Aug. 23, at I, col. 8 (Italy and U.K.);
Aug. 27, at 7, coL 2 (Switzerland); Aug. 30, at 1, col. 8 ijapan).
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to attain a positive trade balance. Accordingly, it instituted a complicated double exchange market made up of the "commercial
franc," with an official dollar parity maintained by the government,
and the "financial franc," which was to be allowed to float. 74 The
commercial franc was basically to be used for the payment of imports and exports,75 and. by maintaining the existing parity it was
intended that French exports should not become more expensive to
foreign buyers. The financial franc was intended to cover all other
transactions in France, including investments and financings by foreign residents as well as tourist expenditures.
The initial results were satisfactory from the French point of
view. While the commercial franc remained pegged at 5.5 francs to
the dollar, the financial franc floated and in the first few months of
liberation the effective revaluation never exceeded three to four
per cent. The complexity of the double exchange system was such
that only France, with its long tradition of exchange and investment
controls, attempted to use it as a method of preventing a general
revaluation that would have hurt its trade position. The two-tiered
system-and the very narrow uses of the commercial franc-had the
effect of making foreign expenditures in France, such as investment,
financing and even tourism, more expensive and hence, to some degree, less attractive.
The success of this system depended in part on limitation of the
differential between the commercial franc and the financial franc.
Accordingly, parallel measures were taken to limit-at least temporarily-the accumulation of dollars in France. These ad hoc measures, adopted informally in early November 1971, included the
application of existing investment controls so as to limit foreign
investments that would require the input of large amounts of dollars
on the French exchange markets,76 and the modification of existing
trade controls so as to require the rapid payment for imports, thus
forcing importers to purchase dollars and other foreign currencies
to pay trade balances.77 This latter provision was intended to prevent
74. International Herald Tribune, Aug. 21-22, 1971, at 1, cols. 7-8; at 9, cols. 2-4.
75. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of Aug. 20, 1971, [1971] J.O. 8313 ("Circulaire
relative a l'execution des transferts a destination de l'etranger''), [1971] D.S.L. 349
(payment for imports at commercial franc exchange rate); Circular of the Ministry of
Finance of Aug. 20, 1971, [1971] J.O. 8313 ("Circulaire relative au rapatriement et a
la cession sur les marches des changes de creances sur l'etranger ou sur des non-residents detenues par des residents et a Ia cession du produit d'operations en capital ou
d'emprunt avec l'etranger''), [1971] D.S.L. 349 (procedure for repatriating proceeds of
export sales).
76. See pt. IV. C. 1. a. infra.
77. Circular of the Ministry of Finance of Aug. 20, 1971, [1971] J.O. 8314, [1971]
D.S.L. 349 (time delays for payments of imports).
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speculation by importers on the eventual revaluation of the franc
that would itself cause a pressure for revaluation. The regulation
required not only payment for all imports within ninety days of
the merchandise clearing customs, but also the immediate payment
of all past due import balances.78 This last provision had particular
effect on French subsidiaries of foreign companies that had over
long periods built up large balances owing to parent companies from
which the subsidiaries had imported merchandise. These unpaid
balances really amounted to long term debts, which were frequently
replaced by the subsidiaries with local franc financing. The purchase of dollars· resulting from implementation of the regulation
temporarily mitigated pressures for further increases in the value
of the floating franc. The fate of these informal measures is less
clear now that a major monetary agreement has been reached.

III.

FRENCH INVESTMENT CONTROLS IN THE COMMON
MARKET CONTEXT

A. General Considerations
French direct-investment regulations, as supplemented by the
exchange controls and the recent modifications described above,
are the most severe of any country in the Common Market. Indeed,
the formal structure of foreign-investment regulations may constitute the highwater mark of regulation of foreign investment in
the developed countries, with the exception of Japan. Such a structure causes stresses within the Common Market, which is dedicated
to complete freedom of intra-Community investment and which,
until now, has had a very liberal policy toward receiving thirdcountry investment within the Market. We will examine first the
problems created by the application by France of its controls to
investments in France by other member countries, and then, more
generally, the political and economic forces at work within the Common Market in developing a joint policy toward third-country foreign investment.
B. Intra-Common Market Investment

The basic economic principle of the Common Market is the
elimination of barriers to the flow of goods, workers, services, and
capital among the member countries.79 Although the abolition of
78. Id., art. 4 B. The payment for materials imported in the past was to be made
within thirty days ·of publication of the circular.
79. See EEC Treaty arts. 9-37 (goods); arts. 48-51 (workers); arts. 52-66 (establishment
and supply of services); arts. 67-73 (capital).
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such barriers was envisioned. to take place .over a period of years,_
the end of the transitional period was formally fixed as December
31, 1969;80 by that date freedom from customs barriers and residence
formalities had largely been achieved.81
Article 67 of the EEC Treaty provides:
During the transitional period, Member States shall, insofar as may
be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the Common Market, progressively abolish between themselves restrictions on the
movement of capital belonging to persons resident in Member States
and any discrimination based on the nationality or the place of
residence of the parties or on the place where such capital is invested.
While directives issued under the Treaty permit the use of exchange
controls and the verification of monetary flows between member
countries, they contemplate that such verifications shall be routine
and shall not constitute an occasion for the exercise of discretion
by the receiving country in determining whether or not to permit
the investment.82
It is obvious that the basic French investment controls, which are
based not on the control of foreign exchange but on the control
of foreign investment itself, contradict these directives. Further, and
more importantly, the French regulations contravene the basic rights
of establishment guaranteed by the EEC Treaty.83
Despite lengthy negotiations benveen the French government
and the EEC Commission, France continued to insist on its right to
impose the 1967 ·investment procedures on investments entering
from member countries, although it did concede that it did not have
the right to refuse investments originating from bona fide domiciliaries of member countries.84 Failing satisfactory resolution of the
problem, the Commission served on the French government, on
April 17, 1969, an avis motive, or formal complaint, requesting the
termination of the application of direct-investment procedures to
80. Article 8 of the Treaty fixed a period of twelve years as the transitional period,
with a possible extension for three additional years. See Rambow, The End of the
Transitional Period, 6 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 434 (1969).
81. See [COMMUNmES] COMMISSION, THIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE COMMUNmES 1969, at 15-17 (1970); [COMMUNmES] COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL
REPORT ON THE AcnvmES OF THE COMMUNffiES 1968, at 21-22 (1969); ter Heide, The
Free Movement of Workers in the Final Phase, 6 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 466 (1969).
82. As of 1960, Member States were to "grant all exchange authorizations required
for the completion or execution of d~rect investments." First and Second Directives
for Implementation of Treaty, art. 67, I CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 1111 1651-67 (May 11,
1960).
83. See EEC Treaty arts. 52-53, 67.
84. Letter from French Government to EEC Commission of July 10, 1968, cited in
"Affaire 66/69: Rapport d'Audience par le Juge Rapporteur Riccardo Monaco" (Luxembourg, Oct. 14, 1970 (mimeo)).
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member countries. 85 Compliance was requested within forty-five
days, with the proviso that extensions could be granted, upon request, if needed to obtain the necessary Parliamentary authorizations. France did not comply with the Commission's request and,
on November 10, 1969, the Commission took the procedural steps
required by Article 169 of the EEC Treaty to bring litigation before
the European Court of Justice.
In the proceedings before that Court the Commission attacked
-without too much opposition-the mechanism of the French
direct-investment regulations that required the filing of a declaration for intra-Community direct investment in France even when
there was no movement of capital. 86 It likewise attacked the reserved
veto power-the droit d'ajournement-which was alleged to constitute an unlawful discrimination against nationals and domiciliaries of member countries other than France, since this veto power
was not applicable to investments in France made by French nationals and domiciliaries.87
The key issue of the proceeding, however, turned on the correct
interpretation of Article 221 of the Treaty, which provides:
Within three years of this treaty coming into force, Member States
shall permit the nationals [ressortissants] of other Member States to
participate financially in the capital of firms or companies, as defined
in Article 58, in the same manner as their mm nationals. This shall
be ·without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty.

In its avis motive, and in its pleadings before the Court of
Justice, the Commission took the position that the right of establishment is given by the Treaty to corporations constituted under
the law of other member countries and that a host country has no
right to investigate the control of that corporation from the point
of view of either the origin of its capital or the nationality of its
management. 88 Finally, the Commission argued that the origin of
the capital that is to be transferred may not itself be investigated
85. EUROPE, No. 319 (n.s.), April 22, 1969, at 7. See also E.E.C. J.O. No. C 3/14 (1970)
(Commission response to a Parliamentary question of Oct. 27, 1969).
86. All information regarding the proceedings in the European Court of Justice
are taken from the official document of the European Court of Justice entitled
"Affaire 66/69: Rapport d'Audience par le Juge Rapporteur Riccardo Monaco"
(Luxembourg, Oct. 14, 1970 (mimeo)) [hereinafter Rapport].
87. Rapport, supra note 86, at 3.
88. The Commission based its argument on the EEC Treaty, art. 58, which provides:
Companies and firms [societes] formed in accordance with the law of a Member
State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place
of business within the Community shall, for the purpose of applying the provisions
of this chapter, be treated in the same way as individual nationals ot Member
States.
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since it is the intention of the. Treaty to favor the free transfer
of capital within the Community in the same manner as it favors
the transfer of goods and services.89
The French defense was based upon its consistent diplomatic
position: while it was willing to receive freely investment from member countries, it was not willing to consider as a member-country
investment one that comes through a Dutch, German, or Italian
corporation dominated by interests from outside the Community.90
France thus retains the right to scrutinize the pedigree of the
corporate investor and to decide whether it should be treated as
a national of a member country. The French government has even
suggested that a common Community policy toward the problem
of corporate control be adopted in order to trace more effectively
the movements of capital from third countries, including capital
that transits through a member country before being invested in
another member country.91
In the proceedings before the European Court of Justice, therefore, the French government contested the Commission's application of the term "nationals [ressortissants] of other Member States"
to corporations that might be formed in accordance with the law
of a Member State and have their registered offices or places of business within such state, as set forth in Article 58, but that might
in fact only be subsidiaries of foreign (third-country) corporations.
It pointed out that a Treaty interpretation that would require a
Member State to give "national" treatment to such a corporation
was unacceptable to a Member State that might feel itself menaced
by third-country investment.92 In such cases, the Member State
would be forced into a position of either complete laissez-faire on
the one hand or total economic dirigisme on the other hand (i.e., to
control the investments of its own nationals and only then to be
able to control that of foreigners as well). Accordingly, the French
argued that the rights of such corporations must be limited to the
narrowest right of establishment (as provided in Article 52) 93 and
could not be extended to the right to invest.
89. The Commission here relied on art. 67 of the EEC Treaty, set out in text
following note 81 supra.
90. During the negotiation of the EEC Treaty, France had apparently wanted to
put into the Treaty provisions covering third-country controlled corporations, but
nothing was done about the French proposal. See Scholten, Company Law in Europe,
4 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 377, 386 (1967).
91. Rapport, supra note 86, at 8.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Art. 52 provides:

304

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:285

· ·1n fact, the definition of Community corporations entitled to
national treatment, as required by Article 58,84 has long bothered
French jurists. As early as 1959, Professor Loussouarn, a leading
French expert on international corporate law, wrote:
It is thus seen that Article 58 of the Treaty of Rome seems to show
a too great liberalism. Its application to the letter risks considering
as nationals of the Community companies which, while having their
registered head office in the interior of the Community, are in
reality controlled by managers who are nationals of countries which
are not signatories of the Treaty of Rome. This danger can be
avoided only if the application of the text is coordinated with existing
national systems relative to the determination of the nationality of
corporations.os
Other commentators have tried by various far-fetched interpretations to establish that Article 58, when taken in conjunction with
other provisions of the Treaty,86 only applies to corporations that
are established under the laws of a member country and that have
a central place of business in such country.07 However, Article 58
states that companies should be entitled to national treatment when
they are formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and
have "their registered head office, central administration or principal
place of business within the Community." 08 As Loussouarn points
out in dismissing the subtle interpretation thus attempted: "When,
in the French language, three words are separated-the first two
by a comma and the second and third by the conjunction 'or'-that
Within the framework of the provisions· set out below, restrictions on the
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another
Member State shall be abolished by progressive stages in the course of the transi•
tional period. Such progressive abolition shall also apply to restrictions on the
setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State
established in the territory of any Member State.
.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to. engage in and carry on
non-wage earning activities, to set up and manage undertakings and, in particular,
firms and companies [societes] within the meaning of Article 58(2), under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establish•
ment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.
It is difficult to see how any effective right of establishment can exist without a right
to invest.
94. See note 88 supra.
95. Loussouarn, La condition des personnes morales en droit international prive,
96 REcUEIL DES CouRS 447, 489 (1959).
96. Notably art. 52, set out in note 93 supra.
97. See Chesne, L'Etablissement des Etrangers en France et la Communautd
Economique Europeenne, in REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE at 283
(1959); Savatier, Le Marche Commun au Regard du Droit International Prive, in id.
at 241.
98. See art. 58, set out in note 88 supra (emphasis added).
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excludes any possibility that two of. the three terms may be required
cumulatively." 99
Nevertheless, the French government had already officially
adopted, in another context, the position that something in addition
to a registered head office is required for a corporation established
under the laws of a Member State to be able to claim Treaty rights.
The government took this position with respect to the issuance of
the carte de commerfant, or commercial trader's card, required for
foreigners to engage personally in business, to serve as the director
of a foreign branch in France, or to serve as chairman or president
of a French corporation.100 The necessity of obtaining this government authorization, which has been alleged by some to serve as a
discouragement to certain foreign implantations,101 would violate
the Treaty's free-establishment provisions if applied to nationals -of
Member States. A number of Commission directives have required
the abrogation of such provisions. 102 By Decree Number 69-815,
France exempted nationals of Member States from the requirement
of obtaining such an authorization for most kinds of commerce.103
This decree provided, however, that with respect to performing commercial services in France either for his own account, or for the
account of another Common Market ressortissant (whether a corporation or a natural person), the exemption was available to a natural
person only if he was a national of a Member State and was domiciled in the territory of a Member State.10,1 A corporation having
only a registered head office in the Community qualified for the
exemption only if it "exercised an activity having an effective and
continued connection with the economy of a Member State."105 The
exact nature of this effective economic link with a Member State has
not as yet been defined, either by statute or by case law. It would
appear that, at the very least, this requirement would permit France
to deny the carte de commerfant exemption to a "post office box"
corporation of a Member State.
99. Loussouarn, Les Societies et la Communaute Economique Europt!enne, 140
59, 62 (1971).
100. See E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS 35 (1971).
IOI. See Frank, La Carte de Commercant: An Example of Legal Restrictions on
American Investment in France, 5 HARV. INTL. L. CLUB J. I (1963).
102. First, Second &: Proposed Third Directives of the Council of the EEC, 1 CCH
CoMllr. MKT. REP. 1111 1651-82 (May 11, 1960).
103. Decree No. 69-815 of :-\ug. 28, 1969, [1969] J.O. 8927, [1969] D.S.L. 335.
104. Id. art. I. This means, for instance, that a Belgian citizen, domiciled in the
United States, is not entitled to the exemption and would have. to obtain a carte de
commerfant like any extra-Community national.
·
·
105. Decree No. 69-815 of Aug. 28, 1969, art. 2, [1969] J.O. 8927, [1969] D.S.L. 335.
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These concepts arguably could have been ·written into the directinvestment regulations in issue before the European Court of J ustice, and France could have attempted to deny Treaty benefits to
a "post office box" corporation being used as a simple device for the
creation of a French subsidiary of a third-country corporation and
the transfer of capital from that corporation. Indeed, the Common
Market Commission itself had, on another occasion, taken the position that Treaty benefits should be granted only to corporations
with a bona fide Community connection.106 The fact is, however,
that France desired a much more effective screen than the Commission's position offered. The system of direct-investment regulations,
as applied by France, preserved its freedom to reject investments not
only from the foreign-controlled "post office box" corporation within
the Community but also from any Community corporation under
foreign control, even though, for example, the Belgian or German
corporation in question might have extensive operations within its
home country. For this reason, France was forced to defend its
regulations on the broad-and weak-grounds that the treatment
of corporations as citizens of Member States entitled to national
treatment pursuant to the Treaty should not be extended to the
right to invest and transfer capital. At the same time, France wished
to be able to use its application procedure to obtain full information
and disclosure, even regarding strictly intra-Community investment
having no ties to third countries.
Although the legal grounds of France's defense were weak, the
wide scope of the political questions raised in fact became a strength.
One sensed a certain hesitancy among Community officials to proceed to final judgment in a case in which the important issue of
the status of Community corporations under foreign control would
be adjudicated, and which might serve as a precedent limiting the
Community's freedom to develop its own Community-wide policy
toward third-country investment. With neither side very anxious
to proceed to judgment, the scene was set for some sort of compromise. After the case had been briefed and argued before the European Court of Justice, France enacted, on February 23, 1971, the
modified direct-investment and exchange control regulations, analyzed above.107 It may be expected, therefore, that there will be no
106. See Council Directive of Dec. 18, 1961, 5 E.E.C. J.O. 36 (1962) (General Program
for Suppressing Restrictions of Free Establishment).
107. See pt. II. C. 2. supra.
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judicial resolution of the problems raised, and that, as a practical
matter, the dispute has been settled.108 The net result is that France,
while formally complying with the Commission's request, has maintained practically intact its power to compel all direct investments
to be made the subject of an application for authorization, as well
as those veto powers earlier possessed. The Commission, on the other
hand, has gained a formal victory over a recalcitrant Member State
and has maintained its freedom of action to develop a Community
policy toward third-country investment.
C. Investment from Outside the Common Market

From the outset, the Community's outlook has been one of openness to third-country investment (which as we shall see, means largely
American investment), with this approach being challenged frequently by France. The issue was first brought to light at the
initial meeting of the European Parliamentary Assembly in 1958.
In these proceedings, the French Prime Minister, Michel Debre,
asked whether the Commission had taken a position on third-country
-and particularly American-investment and suggested that a common Community policy should be taken toward any such investment
that posed dangers to the Member States.109 In its reply, the Commission showed itself to be entirely favorable to third-country investment within the Community and discouraged the attempt to
establish an exclusionary Community policy.110 It did state, however, that it was aware of specific problems that might result from
overconcentration of foreign investment in certain industries and
that it would hold itself ready to consult with Member States and
to receive and disseminate information -about such investments.111
In subsequent responses to Parliamentary questions, the Commission took the position, in 1962, that there were no provisions in
the EEC Treaty enabling the Commission to oppose third-country
investment,112 and, in 1964, that the Commission would continue
108. It is not certain that the EEC Court would always decline to decide such issues,
despite the apparent settlement reached by the parties. Cf. Acciaierie e Tubificio di
Brescia c. Hohe Behorde, No. 31/59 (Eur. Ct. J. June 26, 1959).
109. I E.E.C. J.O. 25 (1958).
110. Id. at 25-26.
111. Id. at 25-26.
II2. 5 E.E.C. J.O. 894 (1962). This early opinion seems to have been confirmed
recently in the statement by the Commission, made in response to a Parliamentary
question, that the purposed purchase by Litton Industries, a U.S. conglomerate, of a
German typewriter manufacturer would not prima facie violate any EEC antitrust
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to follow the situation carefully.113·While noting that statistics available from Member States had not been sufficient to permit the
formation of solid conclusions, the Commission suggested that thirdcountry investment had aided Community growth.114 The Commission could be said to have made the tentative conclusion that
Community enterprises would be able to react successfully to foreign
investment without changing the framework of the EEC Treaty.1111
Since 1965, however, the Commission's response to specific thirdcountry investment problems has in some cases been more reserved,
although in no case has there been any effective action at the Commission level to bar a particular foreign investment. In 1969 the
Commission requested an independent study of the effect of American investment in the Common Market electronics industry. The
report from the study generally opposed continued expansion of
any American investment that threatened the existence or impeded
the formation of European enterprises within the electronics industry.116 The report is still under study by the Commission. Also
in 1969 the Commission, in response to a Parliamentary question,
opposed the further expansion in Europe of Westinghouse by its
proposed takeover of the Belgian company, Ateliers de Construction
Electronique de Charleroi, as part of an over-all European expansion move.117 Finally, with respect to the proposed 1970 takeover
by the American company, International Telephone and Telegraph
provisions, and that, in any event, alleged antitrust violations could be investigated
only in accordance with tbe procedure set forth in Council Regulation No. 17 /62. See
New Developments, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. R.PT. ,i 9342 (1970) (reply to written question
No. 344/69).
113. 7 E.E.C. J.O. 3725 (1964).
114. Id. at 3725-26. The Commission's conclusion that it has inadequate statistical
information on which to base an opinion appears to continue. See 13 E.E.C. J.O. No. C
13/5 (1970) (response of Jan. 21, 1970, to a Parliamentary question of Oct. 27, 1969),
115. An over-all review of the Community's attitude toward third-country investment during the period 1958-1965 is found in W. BALEKJIAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1967),
116. New Developments, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,r 9326 (1969) (summary of 170-

page report, The Electronic Industry of the Common Market and American Invest•
ment.)
117. Id., ,r 9327 (1969) (translation of Commission response, 12 E.E.C. J.O. No. C
129/1 (1969)). The response stated in part:
In the Westinghouse case, one may well ask whether reciprocal holdings by Euro•
pean firms, which would also help to overcome the present isolation of the national
markets and preserve genuine competition in these markets would not be prefer•
able to a reorganization of the electrical industry under American leadership ••••
Furthermore, the Commission belie,·es that a Community policy is needed and that
the solution to the problem of striking a balance between Community and foreign
capital lies in the very dynamism of European industry itself ••• , In the Com•
mi~ion's view, there ts no. question of conflict between Member States and the
institutions of the Community over the goals to be pursued in the matter of
foreign investments.
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Corporation (ITT), of General Biscuit (a European enterprise
formed in 1965 by the pooling of assets of two German, five Belgian,
four French, one Italian, and two Dutch companies), the Commission suggested, after observing that the takeover bid had not, after
all, been successful, that General Biscuit had developed to the point
that outside financing or technical help was no longer needed. Accordingly, it concluded:
[T]he acquisition by ITT of an enterprise that was already an outgrowth of a merger of Community firms would have offered none of
the advantages with regard to strengthening the European industrial
structure which can sometimes be used to justify similar operations.118
It thus appears that the Commission has begun to develop
opinions regarding third-country investment not so much in terms
of hostility to foreign investment as such but rather in relation to
the impact of such investment on the "European industrial structure." This approach implies a theoretical basis of the ideal development of industry within the Common Market. While no
agreement has as yet been reached among the Member States on
this subject, the Commission's thinking is revealed in its 1970 study,
La Politique Industrielle de la Communaute.119 In this interesting
document, the Commission finds that while it is absolutely necessary
for industrial concentration to take place on a Community level,
i.e., to create European enterprises, in £act the only significant concentrations by Europeans have been on the national level within
single Member States. As the Commission found:
The only international liaisons which are developing at a relatively
rapid rhythm are those which unite community enterprises and those
of third countries in general from the United States. They consist
most often in the purchase or the taking over of control by a more
powerful enterprise from a third country. While admitting the great
interest which ties with firms from third countries may present, the
Commission believes that the search for a better equilibrium in this
domain must become an objective of the Community.120
It has thus become the policy of the Commission to favor the formation of "European enterprises"-whose capital and management
will come from member countries and whose center of decision will
lIS.
answer
ll9.
(1970).
120.

New Developments, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP., 1J 9389 (1970) (Commission's
to a written question).
CoMMON MARKET COMMN., LA POLITIQUE !NDUSTIUELLE DE LA COMMUNAUTE
Id. at 27.
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be in Europe-of sufficient dimensions to meet the competitive challenge of "giant enterprises from the other side of the Atlantic."121
Statistics furnished by the Commission in its study tend to prove
the conclusion that third-country enterprises have made better use
of the opportunities for concentration offered by the union of the
six than have the enterprises of the Community countries themselves.
From 1961 through 1969, third-country enterprises established over
3,50Q new subsidiaries within the Community; during the same
period Community enterprises created only 2,300 new subsidiaries
in other Community countries.122 Third-country enterprises also
were more active in taking over a controlling interest in existing
corporations in member countries. The statistics show 820 such takeovers (or mergers) during the period, compared with 257 takeovers
of corporations in member countries by enterprises in other member
countries during the same period.128
The Commission, in its report, refers to the valuable contribution of foreign investment to growth and innovation and denies any
thought of reacting to the problem by a policy of narrow protectionism.124 The report goes on to state:
The very rapid development of foreign investment in the community over the last ten years can, however, for certain sectors of
the economy, pose difficult political and economic problems, as is
witnessed by the attitude of member states at the time of one or
another particular foreign investment operation.
This problem is posed, above all, in sectors where, because of
the present weakness of European industry, these purchases threaten
to prevent, for a long period of time, the birth and development
of European transnational industries. The consequences which result
. . . show the complementary nature of a program of industrial
structures and a policy adopted towards foreign takeovers. A Com121. Id. at 27.
122. Id. at 92.
123. Id. at 92. The complete statistics (based on a private firm's survey) are as
follows for the period 1961-1966 (first six months only): Unilateral Establishment:
From member country to member country
2300
From third country to member country
3546
From member country to third country
1158
Cooperation-Minority Participations-Cross Interests-Joint Subsidiaries:
:Between enterprises in same country
1352
:Between enterprises in Common Market
1001
:Between member country enterprises and third countries
2797
Mergers and Takeovers of Control:
Within same member countries
1861
:Between different member countries
257
From a member country to a third country
215
From a third country to a member country
820
124. Id. at 169.
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munity policy towards industrial structures would be in facq very
difficult to effect if common attitudes towards takeovers were not
developed.
In the view of the Commission, such a concert of purpose need
not be reflected at all by a general restrictive policy in regards to
purchases or takeovers by third country enterprises. But in cases
where these takeovers go against objectives pursued by the governments-objectives which may be not only economic, but may also be
tied to notions of national security-and which have motivated the
public powers to make important financial and economic sacrifices,
the Commission believes that a common policy must be found. In
effect, it appears necessary that the member states henceforth pursue
on a Community level the program which they have followed on a
national level, now put into question by the narrowness of the national dimension. This drawing together would permit the adoption
of a common position for the few sectors where the purchase of
enterprises of significant dimensions imperils the legitimate objectives pursued by member states or defined by the Community.125
It remains to be seen whether the ideas developed in this document will grow into a realistic program for the development of
"European" enterprises and whether this in turn will lead to a formal Community policy on third-country investment. Any such
policy will necessarily draw much from the French legislation and
policy with regard to foreign investment, for its controls are the
most developed, and the Community can learn from their successes
and failures. France wil continue to apply the greatest pressure
for adoption of such a Community policy, for it is well aware that
the effectiveness of its foreign investment policy will be severely
limited as long as a foreign investment denied approval in France
is welcome in the neighboring Common Market countries.

IV.

CURRENT TRENDS IN THE EXERCISE OF FRENCH CONTROLS

A. The Dimension of the Foreign Investment Problem
The problem of foreign investment in France, and the French
reaction to it, can be best understood by first examining the amount
of such investment, its growth, and the degree of foreign control
of certain sectors of the French economy. Precise examination of
these matters is made difficult by the fact that statistics on direct
investment are to some extent inaccurate. Published French statistics, although kept in great detail, are reported on a balance-ofpayments basis, so that real increases in control, or in the growth
of controlled capital assets, may be hidden by money transfers back
125. Id. at 171-72.
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to the controlling countries as dividends or long-term loans. Furthermore, the French statistics frequently credit foreign investments
to such transfer countries as Switzerland, Luxembourg, or sometimes
Belgium without revealing the true identity of the investor. For this
reason, most economists in France rely to a great degree on United
States Department of Commerce statistics-which are based on a survey and reporting basis-to detail the amount of American investment in France; these figures, supplemented by French Ministry of
Finance and Ministry of Industry statistics, give a reasonably complete picture.
American statistics indicate the following progression of United
States annual direct investment in France on a net capital outflow
basis: 126
(millions of dollars)
1960
53

1961

76

1962
124

1963
164

1964
139

1965
152

1966
93

1967

1968

138

-27

1969
83

These statistics are roughly confirmed by French Ministry of Finance
figures for the same period, which likewise show that annual American investment grew only moderately from 1962 to 1967, with a
sharp cutback in 1968.127 These Ministry of Finance statistics show
that during this same period investment from oth~r EEC countries
grew more rapidly, continuing without decrease even through
1968.128
The United States statistics on net capital outflow, while including loans from United States parent companies to subsidiaries
and investment in plant and equipment of the proceeds of foreign
loans or other financing, still reflect money movements more than
they reflect the permanent impact of American investment. The
most important statistics from this latter point of view are the
following figures, which reflect the growth of cumulative investment in France and the revaluation of controlled assets through
currency revaluation and include retained earnings and royalties.120
126. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 29 (Oct. 1970), 24 (Oct.
1968), 42 (Sept. 1967), 34 (Sept. 1966), 24 (Sept. 1965), IO (Aug. 1964), 18 (Aug. 1963), 22
(Aug. 1962), 22 (Aug. 1961) [hereinafter SURVEY].
127. MINISTERE DE L'ECONOMIE ET DES FINANCES, EVOLUTION DES MOUVEMENTS l>E
CAPITAUX Pruvts ENTRE LA FRANCE ET L'ETRANGER 1962-1968, at 3, 5 (1970).
128. Id. at 3.
129. SURVEY, supra note 126, at 28 (Oct. 1970), 24 (Oct, 1968), 42 (Sept. 1967), 34
(Sept. 1966), 24 (Sept. 1965), IO (Aug. 1964), 18 (Aug. 1963), 22 (Aug. 1962), 22 (Aug,
1961).
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(millions of dollars)
1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

741

860

1630

1240

1446

1609

1758

1904

1904

2091

Even these statistics, based on the value of controlled assets, do
not tell the full story because the accounting principles involved
tend to understate value.130 Moreover, in the case of a French
corporation controlled by an American corporation, but with French
minority shareholders, only the value of the percentage of shares
actually owned by the American corporation is included in the
above statistics. From the French point of view, the entire corporate
value should be shown as under foreign control.
The value of cumulative American direct investment in France
has regularly been estimated to constitute between forty and fifty
per cent of all foreign direct investment in France.131 Since, on the
basis of income tax returns, the total net asset value of French
enterprise is said to be approximately 56 billion dollars,132 foreign
investment is seven per cent,133 and American investment is 3.5 per
cent of that total value.
These figures cannot in themselves be alarming to even the most
fervent French proponents of protectionism. American investment
in France is, in absolute figures, half of what it is in Germany and
a third of what it is in the United Kingdom.134 Furthermore, in
terms of American investment per capita, France has one of the lowest figures of the countries in the EEC,135 as the following data indicate:
Belgium-Luxembourg
Netherlands
Germany
France

$76
$69
$52
$36

per
per
per
per

capita
capita
capita
capita

Yet behind these figures lies the real fear of French advocates
of control of foreign investment: the specter of the giant corporation
130. The distortion is due to the use of historical costs to derive the figures. Such
figures rarely represent the current value of the underlying asset or investment; the
distortion gets worse over time with persistent inflation.
131. MINISTERE DE L'lNDUSTRIE, RAPPORT SUR LES !NVESTISSEMENTS ETRANGERS DANS
L'!NDUSTRIE FRAN9AISE 3 (1965) (Bock.anowski Report); Rivoire, lnvestissements lnternationaux, Etrangers en France, Franfais a l'Etranger, L'EcoNOMIE 22 (No. 1.104, Feb.
14, 1970).
132. Rivoire, Le Dossier des Investissements Etrangers (No. 1, Jan. 19, 1970) (Mimeograph, Credit Lyonnais).
133. Id. at 2.
134. See SURVEY, supra note 126, at 28 (Oct. 1970).
135. See Les lnvestissements Americains dans la CCE, in DOCUMENTATION EUROPE•
ENNE 1970 (Serie Syndicale Europeenne No. 9, Aug. 18, 1970).
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under foreign control exercising disproportionate influence over
certain sectors of the economy. If it be true that cumulative foreign
investment represents only seven per cent of French commercial assets, it is also true that very little of this investment is devoted to
agriculture, transportation, public services, construction, the retail
trade, and ship-building. Foreign investment is localized in industry,
and here French corporatons under foreign control represent not
seven per cent, but at least ten to fifteen per cent of asset value.180
The theory that foreign investment tends to concentrate in large
blocs with potential influence over key sectors of the economy seems
to be confirmed by the observation that, of 110 French corporations
reporting sales of more than 100 million dollars annually, 22 are
foreign controlled.137
American investment in France is certainly not limited to giant
enterprises, however, and Department of Commerce statistics indicate that there are 528 American companies doing business in France
through branches, subsidiaries, or joint ventures.138 Of these, 160
companies have more than 200 employees and 43 have more than
1,000. Chrysler's subsidiary, SIMCA, with 21,000 employees, is the
largest.
The domination of certain key sectors of the economy by foreign
interests has long been a fear of the government.130 According to
the most recent unofficial estimates, foreign-controlled corporations
now account for fifty per cent or more of French production in the
following sectors: metals and machinery (zinc metallurgy, tractors,
printing presses and equipment, office equipment, ball bearings, and
razor blades); electrical equipment and electronics (heavy electrical
motors, elevators, telephone equipment, computers and peripheral
136. See Rivoire, supra note 132, at 2. (These figures are computed by including the
entire value of the corporate assets when foreign interests have majority control of
the corporation.)
137. Id. The companies were identified as follows:
American: Bull-General Electric, Esso Standard, General Motors France, I.B.M.
France, Ideal Standard, International Harvester France, Kodak Pathe, L.M.T,·
C.G.C.T., Mobil Oil Fran<;aise, SIMCA.
Belgian: Jeumont-Schenider, Solvays, S.P.I.E.-Batignolles.
Dutch: Phillips-Radiotechnique Group.
Anglo-Dutch: Lever-Astra Group, Shell.
British: BP, Dunlop.
Swiss: Compagnie Electro-Mecanique, SOPAD.
Italian: F.F.S.A.
Canadian: Massey-Ferguson.
138. AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES-FRANCE, U.S. DEPT, OF COM•
MERCE, BUREAU OF INTL. COMMERCE (1970).
139. For official, if now out-of-date, statistics on such sectors of the economy, see
the summaries of the 1962 Ministry of Finance and 1963 Ministry of Industry reports
in Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 674-75.
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equipment, semi-conductors, cathode tubes, recording tape, records,
and electric razors); chemical products (abrasives, detergents, synthetic rubber, carbon black, and photographic equipment); and food
products (biscuits, margarine, concentrated milk, instant coffee, and
powdered soup).140
It is such examples of the penetration and control of specific
industries, rather than the level of foreign investment itself, that
provide the basis for government policy toward foreign investments.
As the French government has pointed out, the continued expansion of the French economy has resulted in annual foreign investment representing a progressively smaller percentage of annual
productive investment in France.141 Therefore, one could expect
the government's policy toward foreign investment to be highly
selective. After some general reaction against American and other
foreign investment in the earliest years of foreign penetration,
French policy has evolved toward a generally favorable reaction to
foreign investment with opposition reserved to selective cases of foreign control.
B.

The Background of Foreign Investment Policy
and Latest Official Pronouncements

The authors have earlier described the French government policy
toward foreign investment prior to 1968.142 It can be summarized
briefly as extremely receptive through mid-1964, at which time a
definite chill set in through the actions of the then Minister of
Finance, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who was acting under the aegis
of President de Gaulle. During the period 1964-1965, a number of
investment applications were denied, and the government failed to
act on a number of others for sufficiently long periods of time that
some of the investors eventually went elsewhere. These policies resulted in a substantial drop in foreign, and particularly American,
investment, the effect of which was felt in 1966. However, no generalized set of investment criteria was established during this period.
140. Rivoire, supra note 132, at 4.
141. MINISTERE DE L'ECON0MIE ET DES FINANCES, supra note 127, at 3. The figures
show the following relation of gross foreign annual investment in France:

w~

U%

1963
1964

4,3%
5.3%

1966
1967

4.0%
4.2%

w~

W~
142. See Torem &: Craig, supra note I, at 701-03.

il%
U%

316

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:285

In January 1966, with the appointment of Michel Debre as Minister of Finance, a period of relaxation set in, and the general policy
reflected a presumption in favor of foreign-including Americaninvestment with the possible exception of cases in which sensitive
national interests were involved.143 This has continued to be French
policy, but events since 1968 have led not only to modification in
the investment control regulations themselves, as described earlier,144
but also to some rethinking of investment criteria.
The general approach toward foreign investment-and, once
again, it should be stressed that the principal problem is seen as
being American investment-was spelled out in speeches given by
President Pompidou and Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas in early
1970. Prior to departing for an official visit to the United States,
during which he was to visit with President Nixon, President
Pompidou called a cabinet meeting (Conseil lnterministeriel) to
consider the problem of foreign investment. The highlights of this
meeting, as released to the press, were as follows: (1) foreign investments were to be considered favorably as long as French national
interests were respected; (2) the formation of the Institut de Developpement Industriel (a government organization designed to provide
selected French enterprises with refinancing, recapitalization and, in
some cases, merger with other French companies, in order to provide
a French industrial solution in certain key areas and to serve as
a positive counterbalance to foreign takeover bids) was announced;
and (3) greater favor was to be shown to foreign investors who create
a new company, and new productive capacity, rather than simply
take over existing French companies.145
President Pompidou developed his thoughts on the subject in
a speech given at the Waldorf Astoria in New York on March 2,
1970, in the following terms:
Not only do we not refuse American investments, but we are
disposed to favor them. Nothing, in my view, would be more prejudicial to French interests than to see American companies establish
themselves only in the other countries of the Common Market. If
Great Britain becomes a member of the Community, this position
of principle would become even more marked, I will say even determinative for the future of the Common Market. We will not accept
being considered only as a "consumer market." This leads us to
desire "production," that is the establishment of factories.
143. Id. at 703.
144. See pt. II. C. 2. supra.
145. Le Monde, Feb. 21, 1970, at 22, col. 3.
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This is what I have had the occasion to say, for example, to
Henry Ford or David Rockefeller.
But it is true that our industry is in full transformation, that it
sometimes only finds with difficulty the necessary capital, and that its
organization, frequently still family structured, raises obstacles to
concentration. The state thus can not take a hands off attitude. It
must aid and encourage concentration, and it must, during this
period of change, protect. That is why we are entirely open to the
implantation in France of American corporations, but we adopt a
selective attitude towards the takeover of French enterprises by
foreign groups of whatever nature.
We wish to avoid having sectors of industry fall under foreign
control under conditions which would, moreover, frequently violate
your own anti-trust legislation. We seek to prevent this type of operation from impeding earlier concentrations on the national level,
and we insist that these takeovers, when they do take place be accompanied by a real enrichment of our economy, notably in the
area of research, and the prospection of the entire European market.
It is in this spirit that I was led, for example, to oppose the purchase of Jeumont-Schneider by Westinghouse, but I would not be
at all opposed to cooperation between the French group, which will,
I hope, concentrate and rationalize this entire sector of our heavy
electrical equipment industry, and a European or American group,
whether it be Westinghouse or another.146

These same points were further developed in a speech by Prime
Minister Chaban-Delmas before the Franco-American Chamber of
Commerce in New York on April 6, 1970. The Prime Minister emphasized that France would adopt a selective attitude toward American takeovers of French companies and would authorize those
"which have positive advantages in terms of employment, research
and development and exports, provided that they do not adversely
affect the industrial reorganization going on in France."147 As proof
of France's positive attitude toward American investment, the Prime
Minister pointed to the opening in New York of the office of the
French Industrial Development Agency created by DATAR.148 This
new agency was created to inform Americans of possible investment
146. Id., March 4, 1970, at 2, col. I.
147. Id., April 17, 1970, at 20, col. I.
148. The Delegation ti l'Amenagement du Territoire et ti l'Action Regionale [hereinafter DATAR] is the agency charged with industrial area planning and regional
development, whose principal purpose is to effect decentralization and to encourage
investment in underdeveloped areas of France, all within the framework of the gov,
ernment economic plan. With regard to both foreign and domestic investment, DATAR
grants important investment incentives, including grants and taX reliefs, to investments
complying with the established criteria. DATAR also has a voice on the Interministerial
Council, which finally decides on the authorization of foreign investments, and may
seek to oppose investment proposals not complying with its goals.
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opportunities in France and of the possibility of obtaining French
government subsidies or tax relief for investments that promote
decentralization and aid to certain regions of France in accordance
·with the government's economic plans. In addition, the Prime Minister stated that new implantations (as opposed to takeovers) would
generally be favored and that French corporations under foreign
control would not suffer discriminatory treatment.
C. Investment Criteria
In determining what investments will be welcome in France, the
Ministry of Finance and the Interministerial Council have applied
broad and flexible criteria. Because of the nature of the political
and economic factors involved in the determinations, these criteria
cannot be anything but guidelines. They are informal and are not
published. Nevertheless, certain issues appear to be regularly taken
into consideration.

I. Factors Favorable to the Granting of
Investment Authorization
a. Positive contribution to French balance of payments. Ordinarily, acquisitions or implantations by foreign companies in France
will be accomplished by the transfer of substantial capital from
abroad, which must be converted into French francs on the official
exchange market, and will have a favorable effect on the balance
of payments. This would not be the case, however, if the foreign
investor were permitted to finance the investment by franc-borrowing. Accordingly, it is virtually impossible to get government approval of a foreign takeover that is to be funded by franc-financing
on the French market. Similarly, an investment will not be approved
if the financial plans call for a small contribution of foreign capital
followed by large borrowing in francs. The general rule is that at
least fifty per cent of the foreign investment, whether takeover,
implantation, or extension of an existing French subsidiary, be fi.
nanced by transfer of foreign exchange from abroad. Finally, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain authorization for the purchase
of stock in a French company in exchange for stock of the investing
foreign company since such stock-for-stock deals are not helpful to
the balance of payments.
In addition to the requirement of a one-to-one ratio between
foreign financing and French financing of direct investments, there
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is a further government preference that a company under foreign
control maintain a reasonable "equilibrium" between equity and
debt. While there is no fixed capital-to-debt ratio, the Ministry will
not approve a direct investment application that calls for "thin incorporation" and a very high debt structure. This preference applies,
in principle, even when the debt is incurred from a foreign source,
for while recourse to foreign borrowing is favored over franc-financing, the government also prefers that the foreign-exchange contribution come in the form of sunken capital. Thus, substantial foreign or
domestic borrowing is a negative factor. The existence of a very large
foreign debt may serve as a force toward future currency speculation,
and large domestic debt is a strain on the French financial market.
Moreover, the government's interest in requiring the maintenance
of a reasonable equity-to-debt ratio continues after the investment
has been effected, and if the annual reports filed with the Ministry
show a substantial imbalance in favor of borrowings, the Ministry
may request the capitalization of loans or undistributed earnings.
These requirements of a positive contribution to the French
balance of payments have been imposed to a lesser or greater degree
since the reimposition of foreign investment controls in I 967. An
unannounced suspension of these criteria by the Ministry of Finance,
commencing in November 1971, was occasioned by the pressures for
revaluation of the franc, following upon defensive monetary measures taken by the United States.149 It became a part of the French
international monetary position to discourage the accumulation of
dollars (and other foreign currencies) in its central banks. Instead
of requiring an input of foreign exchange as a condition of permitting foreign investment, the Ministry, in an heretical about-face, has
required resort to those devices-stock swaps, local franc borrowings
for investment, deferred contribution to capital increases-which
had so recently been forbidden.
For the moment, the French strategy is to defer by all reasonable
devices any import of dollars so that the franc maintains a low profile vis-a-vis the dollar and therefore as a less rich country the revaluation of the franc will be smaller than might be required of the
richer dollar possessors such as Japan and Germany. These new criteria, which constitute a dramatic departure from past French policy,
will probably only be applied as a short-term measure during a
period of monetary instability. In the long run it will continue to
149. See pt. II. E. supra.
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be to France's advantage to seek, in most cases, to require a positive
contribution to its balance of payments as a price of foreign investment authorization.
b. Establishment of a new company as opposed to a takeover.
The idea of encouraging foreign interests to create new companies
rather than to take control of an existing French company is appealing. The establishment of a new enterprise often results in the
infusion of new productive capital and new plant and equipment.
On the other hand, in a takeover, frequently the purchase price
paid to the owners (often a controlling family) is used in passive investment instead of being reinvested in new industrial projects. In
practice, the takeover has been difficult to discourage and the government has realized that denying authorization for a foreign takeover
of a failing corporation will not necessarily preserve that company
for the economy, particularly if a new and dynamic competitive foreign implantation is permitted. Nevertheless, when there is a choice
between competing foreign investments, the one that proposes establishment of a new company and new industrial plant will ordinarily be preferred.
c. Technical contribution to the French economy. The French
government realizes that in certain industries-particularly those
based on the newest scientific developments-foreign industry may
be in advance of French industry and that in some cases foreign investment is the only practical way of bringing these developments
rapidly to France. As a price for permitting such investment, however, the government is anxious to assure that the technical developments and the ongoing improvements benefit the French economy.
What it wishes to guard against is the takeover of an existing commercial network in order to sell items that will be imported in whole
or in part from abroad, thus leading to the exploitation of France as
a mere consumer market. By the same token, the government would
disfavor the installation in France of already depreciated industrial
equipment that will soon be outmoded by newer developments
taking place abroad. In order to advance French interests, the government may frequently require, as the price of authorizing an industrial
implantation, that the company make a commitment to install a
research facility in France. It is hoped that by this device new developments will originate in France and that French personnel will
be in the avant-garde of technological and industrial developments
rather than simply in the position of applying techniques developed
abroad.

December. 1971]

Foreign Investment in France

321

d. Competition in a sector of the economy suffering from lack
of competition. The French economy is in many sectors characterized
by small units, frequently family structured, which may require some
protection during the present period of reorganization and concentration.150 At the same time, there are a few areas of industry, frequently
those requiring a very large capital investment, in which the relatively small size of the French market has led to virtual singlecompany monopolies. When these conditions exist, the French
government will favor the entry of competition even if foreign companies are the only effective possibility. An example of the application of this policy was the authorization given to Alcoa to establish
an aluminum extrusion facility in France at Chateauroux in l'Indre.151 Alcoa constituted welcome competition for Pechiney, a giant
company that engaged in all facets of the aluminum industry throughout the world and controlled about ninety per cent of the French
aluminum industry.
e. Aiding France's over-all economic plan and decentralization
policy. A study of the French attitude toward foreign investment
cannot be understood without considering the French government's
role in directing economic growth in general• and decentralization
from the Paris region iri particular. ·Economic goals for the French
economy are established in an over-all five year plan (Le Plan) that
the government seeks to implement, on the one hand, by its control
of public expenditures and the management of the large sectors of
the economy dominated by government-owned corporations (the
aviation industry, insurance companies, some banks, and some automobile companies) and, on the other hand, by offering incentives
or imposing penalties for certain activities of privately o,vned c-0ncerns. The decentralization program is a specific instance of this
guidance: substantial subsidies_and tax-saving programs are available
for new industrial implantation in depressed areas. Foreign companies seeking to invest in France are entitled to obtain such subsidies on the same footing as local companies. Investment applications
will tend to be favored if they will result in creating new jobs in
zones designated by the government; by the same token; insistence·
on implantation in an area considered to be overcrowded-notably
the Paris region-may result in a refusal.
£. French participation in the corporate decision-making process. One of the greatest fears_ en~endered by foreign investment is

supra.

150, See te.xt accompanying note 146
:15L. R. DICKIE,. FOREIGN.~: FRANCE .86 .(1970).
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that important management decisions about investment, development, and operations will be made not in France but abroad at the
headquarters of a parent company, where French interests will not
be sufficiently considered. Even though management of the local subsidiary may be confided largely to French personnel this local influence is not a full solution to the problem, because key decisions will
necessarily be made by those who have the ultimate control of the
subsidiary. Put another way, the problem of the so-called multinational company is that the power of control is exercised neither by
the nationals of the country where a subsidiary is established nor by
a mixed group of nationals from a number of countries where operations are conducted. Rather, the control is exercised exclusively by
the key members of the management and board of directors of the
foreign parent company, who have the nationality of the country
where the parent company is located. Thus, key decisions affecting
French subsidiaries are very frequently made in the United States
by Americans, who may be more concerned about what is good for
the entire multinational group than what is good for the French
subsidiary. Not all decisions favor the American parent, but they may
favor one country over another instead of letting each foreign affili•
ate do what is best for itself. Hence, unfairness to local interests can,
and sometimes does, result. A few multinational companies-particularly those in highly developed technological industries-are responding to this psychological problem by naming foreign personnel to key
positions in the parent company itself. Thus, the president of IBM
World Trade Corporation is a Frenchman, Jacques Maisonrouge,
and there are a number of other foreigners on the board of directors.
Another company in the computer industry, Control Data Corporation, has named as its vice-president in charge of international
operations a Frenchman, Gerard Beaugonin. Other examples abound.
These experiments are still in their infancy, but a multinational
company whose organization has been designed to permit management personnel from foreign subsidiaries to succeed to decisionmaking posts in the parent company will be looked on with favor
when it seeks to establish itself in France.

2. Factors Unfavorable to the Granting of Investment Authorization
Obviously, the principal factor weighing against investment approval is the failure to meet the positive criteria described above.
But the following special situations, which may lead to refusal of
authorization, also merit consideration.
a. Domination of a sector of the economy. As pointed out earlier,
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there are a number of sectors of the French economy in which
foreign-controlled subsidiaries already account for more than fifty
per cent of the sector's production.152 That an entire area of the
French economy might fall under foreign control is a pervading fear
in certain government circles. The reaction is to preserve the French
elements in the area by refusing authorization for a takeover or for
the installation of a new enterprise if either would result in a
foreign firm dominating the activity. It is also true that domination
most frequently arises in an area where the foreign company's technological advances permit it to attain a position of control that
mere size and economic strength alone could not have attained. An
example would be the semi-conductor industry in France, which is
dominated by American subsidiaries. In this area, the government
had a difficult decision to make, because a refusal to permit foreign
investment might have prevented the French economy as a whole
from profiting by the new developments.
b. Interference with an officially sponsored ''privileged field."
The government response to the threat of foreign domination has
been to sponsor, in certain key areas, a "French" solution. This has
been accomplished by applying incentives to induce mergers resulting in local entities of dimensions sufficient to meet foreign competition. These companies may then be favored in the awarding of
contracts by the government and its nationalized corporations. In
the computer "software" field, for example, the Plan Calcul was
designed to secure a French solution for at least part of the computer
industry. (The computer "hardware" sector was already substantially
dominated by the foreign-controlled companies, IBM and Bull-General Electric/Honeywell.) If a proposed new foreign investment
would jeopardize such a government-sponsored program, it might
well be refused. It should be emphasized that the areas in which such
government concerns exist are very few indeed.
c. Excessive "border area" investments. There is at least one
field in which official concern is directed at something other than
American investment. The problem exists in the areas of France
bordering on Germany-particularly Alsace-where German capital
has been invested extensively and at an ever-increasing rate, both in
takeovers of companies and in the establishment of new companies.
It has been estimated that from 1955 to 1968, thirty per cent of the
30,000 new jobs created in the area have been the result of German
investment. 153 While government concern about this growing foreign
152. See text accompanying pote 140 supra.
153. Les Echos, April 14, 1969, at 4, col. 3.
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influence is real, opposition would be difficult politically because it
would necessitate moving against another member of the Common
Market, and also because economically the Alsace area desperately
needs new investment to replace the dying coal and steel industries.
Hence, the latest official position is that no government action will
be taken against such foreign investment, but that a special effort
now should be made to encourage new and counterbalancing national investment.154 It is not certain, however, that an attempted
investment in a particularly sensitive border area might not meet
renewed government opposition today.
It should be made clear that, although these criteria are considered
by the government in its decision-making process, they do not constitute hard-and-fast rules. As the authors orginally emphasized in
1968, there never have been published any official guidelines for
foreign investment.155 This is still true. The administration continues to reserve the right to weigh each application separately, and
deliberately rejects the formulation of a detailed investment code in
the interest of preserving its ad hoc administrative discretion. It is
therefore more meaningful to consider some of the cases in which the
veto power has been exercised, with recognition of the fact that only
a handful of cases a year meet with rejection and that hundreds of
foreign investments are eventually authorized.
D.

Some Examples of Investment Refusals

I. Bull-Bull-General Electric-Honeywell-Bull
No example demonstrates both the concern of the French government toward foreign investment and the practical limits on the power
of government intervention better than the complicated history of
Compagnie des ·Machines Bull, the leading French computer company. The story, which has been described in some detail elsewhere,1 60
can be divided into three acts.
First, in Februray 1964, the French government opposed General
Electric's (GE) bid to take a minority participation in Bull. Bull,
the largest strictly French computer company, had impressive technical qualifications and was commercially well established with an
154. Id. (remarks of Couve de Murville, then Prime Minister).
155. See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 702.
156. The most complete version of the first episodes in the Bull saga, including
reproduction of the pertinent official -government and corporate documents, is found
in VEILLARD, L'AFFAIRE BUI.I. (S.P.A.G., Paris, 1968). See also R. DICKIE, FOREIGN INVEST•
MENT: FRANCE 68-71 (1970).
.
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excellent sales and service network covering Western Europe·. However, by 1962 it found itself technically outdistanced in several fields
by IBM's French subsidiary. Because of its relatively small size in
comparison with the multinational computer giants, its :finances were
strained to the breaking point by the effort to maintain a competitive
budget for ongoing research and development and by the special
financial burdens arising from the necessity of marketing computers
by means of a self-financed leasing program. In these circumstances,
discussions were entered into with GE to make arrangements for
that company to take a twenty per cent participation in Bull. Although the final financial terms were not agreed upon, discussions·
were based upon a proposal calling for the issuance of 700,000 new_
shares at forty dollars per share, which would have constituted a
contribution to capital of 28 million dollars.151 In addition, GE
promised technical assistance to Bull and development of Bull's own
research facilities. On February 4, 1964, following lengthy consultations between Bull and the French government, but prior to final
agreement between the parties themselves on the precise terms to
submit to the government, the Minister of Finance advised Bull that
the government would oppose this foreign investment.158 The government favored a "French" solution and attempted to impose one by
withholding government credits and orders from Bull until it was
agreed that a new French group would be permitted to take over
effective control of Bull. The new group was to be comprised of two
technical companies, C.S.F. (Compagnie Generale Telegraphie Sans
Fil) and C.G.E. (Compagnie Generale d'Electricite), a=id two financial groups, Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas and a consortium of
French government controlled banks. The new group obtained
a twenty per cent participation- in Bull for 7 million dollars as the
result of the purchase of 700,000 new shares at ten dollars per share.
Further increases in capital and further long-term bank financing
were acknowledged to be necessary and were envisioned. A remarkable part of the arrangement, sponsored by the Ministry of Finance,
was that the new holders of twenty per cent of the equity were to
obtain control of two thirds of the board of directors.159 But while
this "fire-brigade" solution secured some interim bank financing for
Bull, which was then on the verge of bankruptcy, and responded to
some of the concerns of the French government about the manage157.

VEILLARD,

supra note 156, at 34, 40-41.

-158. Id. at 62.
159. Id. at 145.
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ment structure of Bull, it did not solve any of the long-range technological and commercial problems of the company.
It was in these circumstances that new discussions (which may be
termed the second act) were undertaken with GE in the interest of
responding to the needs of Bull while meeting the objections of the
Ministry of Finance. The result was the splitting up of the operating
portions of Bull into two parts: Societe Industrielle Bull-General
Electric (S.I.B.G.E.), the research and production unit, in which Bull
retained fifty-one per cent of the shares and GE obtained forty-nine
per cent; and Compagnie Bull General Electric (B.G.E.), the sales and
service organization, which would be controlled by GE with fifty-one
per cent of the shares. GE's payment for these shares amounted to
210 million francs, or approximately 42 million dollars. This participation was equal to a purchase price for Bull shares of approximately
fifteen dollars per share. The new arrangement was vastly different
and far less desirable to Bull than the original proposal of approximately forty dollars per share for the twenty per cent interest. The
new structure became effective in November 1964, after receiving
the formal agreement of the Minister of Finance.160 GE, with government approval, subsequently increased its holdings in these two
companies to sixty-six per cent of the shares, because the French
interests failed to respond to subsequent calls for increased capital.
If the second act of the Bull drama demonstrated the limitations
on the government's ability to utilize its control powers to impose
a solution contrary to the commercial forces at play, the third act
demonstrated just how volatile those forces could be. After years of
struggle to gain a lasting foothold in the computer market, General
Electric in 1970 entered into an agreement with its American competitor, Honeywell, to transfer its computer operations throughout
the world to a new company that would be dominated by Honeywell.
This transfer of control of the Bull subsidiaries from one American
company to another required French government authorization.
After receiving adequate assurances from Honeywell that the level
of local employment would be maintained and that research would
continue to be conducted in France, the government granted its
authorization and Bull-General Electric became Honeywell-Bull.161
2. Westinghouse-]eumont-Schneider
If the "Affaire Bull" demonstrated French concern for the key
computer sector of the economy, the· "Affaire Westinghouse" was
160. Id. at 178.
161. International Herald Tribune, July 30, 1970, at 7, col. !!.
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motivated by a similar concern for the heavy electrical equipment
sector.162 The leading French company in this area is JeumontSchneider, an affiliate of the famous Schneider complex. Interestingly
enough, this company had been partially under foreign control since
1966 when the young Belgian financier and heir to an industrial
empire, Baron Empain, took a twenty-five per cent interest in the
parent, Schneider S.A., and a sixty-five per cent interest in J eumontSchneider itself. In 1968 Westinghouse opened negotiations with
the Baron to acquire both his Belgian electricai equipment company,
Ateliers de Construction de Charleroi (partially controlled by the
Empain Group), and Jeumont-Schneider. The intent of Westinghouse was to create a multinational "European" heavy electrical
equipment consortium through the acquisition of its French, Belgian,
Spanish, and Italian licensees.
The first request for authorization for the takeover was made in
October 1968; the reaction of the de Gaulle government at that
time was to withhold authorization pending realization of a hoped-for
French solution to the problem. With the change of government
following the resignation of President de Gaulle in April 1969, a
second attempt to obtain authorization was made. Assurances were
expressly given that a research facility would be created in France to.
ensure French and European participation in the future development of this key industry. On December 5, Xavier Ortoli, Minister
of Scientific and Industrial Development, told the Westinghouse
executives that the government considered maintenance of the heavy
electrical industry in French hands as "a national imperative."163
Consequently, authorization was denied. The French solution
created to offset the proposed Westinghouse takeover was a concentration between the French companies of Alsthom and C.G.E. (Compagnie Generale d'Electricite). 164 What further international alliances
this new French group will be required to enter in order to attain
the size and stature necessary for further development in this key
industry is not yet certain; nor is it certain what larger group
Jeumont-Schneider will eventually join, the Westinghouse arrangement having failed. In the meantime, Westinghouse goes forward
with its European plan, excluding, for the moment, France.
162. The Westinghouse-Jeumont-Schneider case was widely reported in the French
and international press. For some of the background, see Bonnot, Energie: L'Atome
aux Mains des Industrielles, L'Express (Paris) Dec. 1-7, 1969, at 90, 91, col. l; Enterprise, Dec. 20, 1969, at 53, col. 1.
163. France Blocks Westinghouse Combine, International Herald Tribune, Dec. 6,
1969, at 1, col. 5.
·
·
'
164. Le Figaro, Dec. 7, 1969.
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3. Leasco-SEMA
In early -1969, the American company, Leasco, negotiated with
the French company, SEMA, to obtain a minority interest in SEMA
and further expand its computer software and computer leasing
programs in Europe.165 The SEMA group consisted of a French
parent company, SEMA (Metra International), having both French
and foreign (German, Belgian, Spanish, British, and Italian) subsidiaries, and having approximately 2,000 employees. Leasco, which
had gotten its start in computer leasing in 1961 and had rapidly
expanded into "s,oftware" activities, employed approximately 8,500.
Its shares, first opened to public trading in 1965, had enjoyed a
spectacular increase in value through 1969. On February 5, 1969, the
presidents of the two companies announced that Leasco, in return for
a contribution of 60 million francs, would take a twenty per cent
interest in the capital of SEMA and that the entry of other European
companies into the group was possible. It was intended, however,
that the majority interest would remain in French hands.100
The acquisition, which involved both the taking of a substantial
equity interest and a program for cooperation with the American
company, required the authorization of the Minister of Finance,107
and an appropriate investment declaration was made. As time passed,
the parties began to suspect that the deal could not obtain the
:requisite approval. Finally, on April 20, Leasco, realizing that its bid
'ivas in fact being rejected by the process of delaying tactics, withdrew
its offer.168
The government's refusal of an American minority acquisition in
the computer software field demonstrated its strong intent to preempt for local interests the software field, in which the smaller capital expenses involved do not require the intervention of a huge
multinational company ·as do the greater capital outlays in the computer hardware field. It was reasoned that the taking of a minority
interest by a much larger foreign company would lead eventually to
an increase in this participation and eventual foreign domination.
This is the same thinking that was manifested in the government's
"Act I'' intervention to prevent General Electric from taking a
twenty per cent interest in Bull.
This policy of protectionism toward the fledgling French com165~
166.
167.
168.

Le Monde, Feb. 5, 1969, at 26, col. 5.
Id. (announcement by the management of SEMA).
S~e. text.accompanying. notes 9-13_ supra..._
Le Monde, April 20-21; 1969, at 28, col. I. ·· ·

December 1971]

Foreign- Investment· in France

329

puter software industry had· earlier been applied to prevent another
American company (Auerback Corporation) from obtaining a forty
per cent interest in the French software firm, CEGOS. 169 The policy
has not, however, been applied blindly. At the end of 1969, the
Minister of Finance authorized the creation of a joint venture between CEGOS (fifty-one per cent), the Credit Lyonnais (twenty-nine
per cent), and the California company, Tymshare (twenty per cent),
for the creation of a new telephonic computer time-sharing operation
based on the American company's developments and experience.170
This venture did not create the problem of a takeover of a French
activity since it involved the creation of new technical activity
through the coordination of the assets of the partners.
·

4. ITT-·Pompes Guinard
ITT, today America's ~ighth largest industrial enterprise,171
owes its rapid growth over the last ten years to ?- policy of diversification that has changed it from an· electrical and communications
manufacturer to a high-flying conglomerate.172 One of its diverse
activities includes the manufacture of pumps, and it is represented
on the .French market in this activity by its control of Pompes_
Salmson, a French company acquired in 1962.
In 1968, ITT sought control of a second French company in this
sector, Pompes Guinard. Combined with its existing activities, this
acquisition would have given ITT forty per cent of the French
market. Conscious of the sensitivity of the government to foreign
domination of an industrial sector, ITT stressed in its application
that the center of the French company's decision-making would
remain in France, that the management would remain French, that
it would pursue locally industrial research, and that it would develop
export markets and create new jobs.173 It also emphasized that the
purchase would be favorable to France's balance of payments, not
only because increased exports would be possible through ITT's
distribution network, but aJso because the Guinard factory in Chateauroux could be used to s~pply electric motors to Salmson, which
until then had purchased two thirds of its requirements from
abroad.174
169. Id. at col. 2.
170. Les Echos, Dec. 5, 1969, at 7, col. I.
171. The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE,
May 1971.
172. See I.T.T.-A Study in Diversity, FINANCIAL WORLD, Dec. IO, 1969, at 5.
173. See International Herald Tribune, Feb. 6, 1970, at 7, col. 2.
174. Les Echos, Oct. 22, 1969, at 2, col. 4.
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Despite ITT's attempts to assuage French fears, Ministry of Finance authorization was postponed temporarily in February 1970.
ITT spokesmen declared that the company would protest this re•
fusal of investment authorization to the Nixon Administration and
to the State Department.175 The protest, if in fact officially made, was
not effective and the ajournement of direct investment authorization
became definitive in June. 176

5. Fiat-Citroen
French authorities have remained traumatized from the effects
of the aquisition in 1963 of the major French automobile manu•
facturer, SIMCA, by Chrysler.177 This takeover was effected by the
purchase of publicly held shares on the French Bourse by Swiss
intermediaries, and was not subject to government veto pursuant to
th.en prevailing exchange control regulations.17 8 Since that time the
administration has watched closely over the industry, and it is safe
to say that any further attempted American penetration by way of
a takeover in the basic production area would meet vigorous opposi•
tion. At the same time, the other elements of the French national
automobile industry, including the state-owned company, Renault,
and more particularly the independents, Citroen and Peugeot, have
sought to expand their vistas to a European or multinational basis,
Citroen, representing twenty-five per cent of French production,
was the most active in seeking an alliance, in part because of its
need for outside financing and in part because of its need for com•
mercial outlets for marketing of exports, a field in which it had
traditionally lagged behind Renault and Peugeot.17° The search for
such an arrangement was facilitated by the fact that control of Citroen
rested largely in the hands of the Michelin family, who also controlled France's largest tire manufacturer.180 This situation attracted
the interest of the giant Italian automobile manufacturer, Fiat. In
September of 1968, Fiat and Citroen jointly announced that an
175. International Herald Tribune, Feb. 6, 1970, at 7, col. 2.
176. Les Echos, June 19, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
177. For a further discussion of details of the takeover, see R. DICKIE, supra note
156, at 71.
178. Present investment controls provide that purchase on the stock exchange of
shares is exempt from direct-control procedures only if the purchaser acquires less
than 20% of the corporation's outstanding stock in this manner, Decree No. 67-78 of
Jan. 27, 1967, art. 2(3)(b), [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967) D.S.L. 81.
179. See Thelier, Le Gouvernement va se prononcer sur l'opportunitt! d'un accord
entre Citroen et Fiat, Le Monde, Sept. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 5, and at 22, col. 3.
180. Le Monde, Oct. 1, 1968, at 24, col. 1.
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accord in principle had been reached, pursuant to which Fiat would
take approximately a thirty per cent interest in Citroen (by the
formation of a holding company-to be owned fifty-one per cent by
Michelin and forty-nine per cent by Fiat-to acquire Michelin's
interest in Citroen), and that a series of joint marketing arrangements
would be entered into. 181 The agreement was subject to the obtaining of any required government authorizations.
On October 12, 1968, the office of the Prime Minister announced
that the government would not permit the investment, although no
objection was voiced to the principle of technical and commercial
cooperation. The government's reason was said to be the desire to
maintain the "independence of an important French industrial
corporation" and to ensure the continued equilibrium of the French
automobile industry and the employment situation therein. 182
The denial of this intra-Common Market investment surely
violated the provisions of the EEC Treaty. 183 Nevertheless, the parties
were not anxious to raise the legal question,1 84 and instead continued
to work toward an agreement acceptable to the government. On
October 28, 1968, the two firms announced a new agreement pursuant to which the Italian group would acquire only fifteen per cent
of the capital of Citroen. This time the French government voiced
no objection.185
Finally, two years later, in July 1970, Fiat renewed its bid to take
a larger interest in the capital and management of Citroen, by the
same method of taking a forty-nine per cent share in a company having :fifty-three per cent of the shares of Citroen. In a different climate
of political opinion, the French government offered no opposition,
and Citroen became part of a multinational enterprise.186
6. Perfumes: Helena Rubenstein-Parfums Rochas

By 1970, a substantial part of the French perfume industry was
already under foreign control.1 87 The French government had im181. Le Monde, Sept. 29-30, 1968, at 1, col. 5.
182. Le Monde, Oct. 12, 1968, at 21, col. 2.
183. EEC Treaty art. 67.
184. A question was raised by a legislator in the European Parliament regarding
the Treaty violation, but the Commission's answer, while clearly setting forth the
applicable freedom of investment principles, stated that it had no information permitting it to conclude that an investment application had been denied by the operation of a forbidden national investment regulation. This was the result of the French
government's making its objection on a political level and presumably not by a written
investment refusal. See 12 E.E.C. J.O. No. C 6/3 (1969).
185. Le Monde, Oct. 29, 1968, at 25, col. I.
186. Le Monde, July 30, 1970, at 10, col. I.
. 187. It has been said that only four of the fifteen major French perfume com-
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posed no veto upon the acquisitions of Belmain and Raphael by
Revlon, of Coty by Pfizer, of Caron by A.H. Robbins, of Molyneux
by Union International Company, of Forvil by Bristol Myers, of
Lucien Lelong by Nestle Lemur, of Lentheric by Beecham, and of
Corday by Max Factor.188
Parfums Rochas was a likely candidate for a foreign takeover. It
ranked sixth among French perfume manufacturers and, while having
a very substantial turnover, had little penetration of the important
United States export market.189 In these circumstances, an American
buyer with knowledge of the American market should have been
able to give the company its greatest chance for an increase in export
sales. At the same time, there were important internal reasons for
selling to outside interests. While a substantial interest in the company was owned by the widow of the founder of the company, who
also managed the company, there were important minority interests
held by active managers within the company. Litigation had developed between the two factions and a receiver had been appointed
to manage the business because of the conflict. The Rochas family felt
that a sale to a third party would be a solution to the litigation.
The American company, Helena Rubenstein, Inc., which already
had substantial interests in the beauty products field in France,
made an offer to purchase eighty per cent of the company for 24
million dollars,190 a figure representing a price/ earnings ratio of about
twenty-to-one. On June 10, 1970, the Ministry rejected this "American solution" to the problem.191 The grounds were apparently that
although many promises had been made in the past by American
purchasers of cosmetic and perfume companies, in fact export targets
propounded to induce France to authorize the takeovers had seldom
been realized. As no technology was involved in this proposed takeover, there was no special reason for the government to acquiesce in
the American bid. Instead, a local solution was favored. The leading
French pharmaceutical house, Laboratoires Roussel-Uclaf, concluded
-

-

-

panies remain under strictly French control. See R. DICKIE, supra note 156, at 76. A
distinction should be made, however, between the beauty products and toilet products
sector of the industry on the one hand, in which approximately 50% of the industry
.is under foreign control, and the alcohol-based perfume sector (scent making) on the
other hand, in which foreign penetration is only 17%, Les Echos, June 10, 1970, at
4, col. 4.
188. ie Figaro, June 10, 1970, at 16, col. 7.
189. Id.
190. Les Echos, June 10, 1970, at 16, col. 7.
191. Le Figaro, June 10, 1970, at 16, col. 7.
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a takeover arrangement in O~tober 1_970.!92 Oddly enough, a -contr911ing interest in Roussel-Uclaf is held l;>y a <;erman chemical concern. If a strictly French solution was not produced for Rochas, at
least a European solution was found.

7. Food Products: Grey Poupon and Orangina
It should not be thought that Ministry of Finance disapproval has
been reserved solely for foreign investments in key sectors of the
economy, such as automobiles, or in highly developed technical areas,
such as computers. Recently two foreign investments in the food
products field have been vetoed.
_
On December 8, 1970, the Finance Ministry rejected the H. J.
Heinz proposal to acquire a controlling interest in Grey Poupon, an
important local Dijon mustard manufacturer with a gross turnover
of about 10 million dollars per year. 193 The acquisition of this spe.cialized, one-product company would have given Heinz a toe-hold
in France.
Both companies were well kno1vn and therefore a capital movement among such prominent parties excited special administrative
scrutiny, not of the financial terms and royalties, but of the export
potential afforded by Heinz as purchaser balanced against the loss
to the French patrimony of a strong, albeit small, piece of its economy. The economic reason for the refusal was that Heinz, which
was not essentially in need of a local mustard source, really wanted a
strong French distributing organization to market its products produced abroad. Poupon, therefore, would have given a strong distribution network to Heinz and would have made it possible for
Heinz to flood France with foreign food imports, thus injuring the
struggling and fractionized French food industry. This detrimental
effect would have been unaccompanied by any real advance in technology and would have been balanced by only a dubious increase in
exports. In this situation, the administration concluded France would
be better served by a purchase by a French concern or, failing that,
by a Common Market group. Accordingly, it was announced on
January 2, 1971, that the French company, Chocolats Poulain, would
take over Grey Poupon at the same price that the American company would have paid.194
A similar veto was invoked by the Ministry several weeks later
192. Les Echos, Oct. 9, 1970, at 6, col. 1.
191J. Les Echos, Dec. 29, 1970, at 6, col. 1.
194-. Les Echos, Dec. 24-, 1970, at 6, col. 1.
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in regard to a bid by General Foods Corporation to acquire Orangina,
the large French soft drink company.195 The apparent motivation for
the government's refusal was not so much outright opposition to
foreign penetration in this nonstrategic sector of the economy as it
was a desire to stave off a foreign takeover until it could be determined whether a competing French takeover could be arranged.
In the food products industry, as in a number of other industries,
there has been a program of incentives to encourage industrial concentrations in the interest of structuring efficient and competitive
French industries. In the Orangina case, the tactic worked: a French
solution was found when a bid by the French companies, Ricard
and Pernod, was forthcoming196 with the encouragement of the
Institut de Developpement Industriel.107
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The discussion in the preceding section of a few of the more
recent negative government actions on foreign-investment proposals
illustrates the discretionary powers of the French government in
applying its foreign-investment procedure. There are no formal
statutory criteria for the granting of foreign-investment authorizations with which the government is required to comply. The law
thus provides no limitations on government agency action, but rather
a procedure pursuant to which government discretion may be exercised. The discretionary judgment is made on the basis of undefined
economic and political factors.
In fact, the reservation of state discretionary powers to deal with
special problems that foreign investment may pose is not an unusual
occurrence in the world today. In exceptional cases, foreign investment may be thought to impinge on national sovereignty itself, or
at least to pose a threat to national goals.198 In such cases, states can
be expected to act in formal or informal ways to oppose the investment.
Occasionally, an investment may be rejected simply as an act of
state without reliance on specific statutory authority. At other times,
diplomatic or informal channels of communication may be used to
inform the interested parties that the investment will not be permitted. Such ad hoc intervention, while reflecting the discretionary
195. Les Echos, Dec. 29, 1970, at 6, col. l.
196. Les Echos, Dec. 24, 1970, at 6, col. l.
197. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
198. See A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
Surrey &: C. Shaw ed. 1963).
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powers of the state, can only be used in unusual circumstances and,
in the absence of a requirement for notification of foreign investment,
there is always the possibility that a government will be faced with
the fait accompli of a completed foreign investment without having
been able to take measures against it.
In contrast to these regimes in which no formal investment control procedures have been established, the French have created a
formidable system of exchange and foreign-investment controls that
requires notification to and approval by the government of substantially all foreign investments and financings. This procedure
has been used less frequently to bar absolutely particular investments
than to require that foreign investments meet criteria considered
to be favorable to the economy. While foreign investment controls
are considered by the government to be only one of its many weapons
for attaining a planned economy, it is nevertheless true that the
government does not have the same veto power over new investment
by domestic corporations that it enjoys over foreign investment.
If it is true that the ultimate weapon of denial of investment
authorization is, under French law, a nonreviewable action vested
in Ministry discretion,199 that does not mean that such action might
not run counter to international obligations. These obligations are
the result either of bilateral treaties-such as the Franco-American
Convention of Establishment,200 which protects both the right of
establishment and the right of investment-or of multilateral treaties, of which the most important is the EEC Treaty.
The authors suggested some years ago that the closer relationships established by the EEC Treaty and the international mechanisms available for the enforcement of treaty rights made it likely
that a protest would be made against French investment controls
pursuant to the EEC Treaty rather than under the looser bilateral
treaties. 201 That suggestion apparently was accurate; the direct clash
199. See Torem &: Craig, supra note 1, at 715-17.
200. [1960) 2 U.S.T. 2398; (1960) J.O. 11220. Article 5 of this treaty provides for
national treatment:
I. Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall be accorded
national treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial,
financial and other activities for gain within the territories of the other High Contracting Party •.•. Accordingly, such nationals and companies shall be permitted
within such territories:
(b) to organize companies under the general company laws of such other
High Contracting Party, and to acquire majority interests in companies of such
other High Contracting Party;
(c) to control and manage the enterprises which they have established or
acquired.
201. See Torem &: Craig, supra note I, at 711.
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between the conttoJs,and the·.free-investment and free-establishment
provisions of the Treaty resulted in a· law suit by the Commission
against France in the European Court of Justice. However, that
suit was settled by a common agreement that has permitted France
to continue its foreign-investment policies and procedures without
substantial modification, although France continues to be subject
to an obligation to admit investment from other member countries
after simple notification to the government about the proposed investment.
For the future, perhaps the most important issue is whether the
Common Market will develop a common foreign-investment policy
in regard to third-country investment and whether procedures for
the regulation of foreign investments in the Common Market will
be developed. In this regard, we note that certain French attitudes
toward the foreign-investment problem are gaining more Common
Market support at the present time than has ever been the case in
the past. The EEC Commission might, in special cases, oppose a
specific foreign investment on economic or political grounds. However, it seems unlikely that other member countries, which do not
have the same tradition of centralized financial power and government economic control that France has, would support the kind
of procedures operational in France that require a specific government authorization ·for every foreign investment. In these circumstances, one can expect that the French foreign-investment controls,
with their highly developed filing and authorization procedures, will
continue to stand alone in the Common Market. This fact should
play a role in support of the continuation of the policies of moderation that have marked application of the French controls in recent
years.

